Osmond Lane Homeowners Association, an unincorporated association v. George C. Landrith, Jr. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association, an
unincorporated association v. George C. Landrith,
Jr. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell A. Cline; Crippen & Cline; attorney for appellant.
Thomas W. Seiler; Robinson, Seiler & Anderson; attorney for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Osmond Lane Homeowners v. Landrith, No. 20090157 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1531
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 




GEORGE C. LANDRLTH, JR., 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Appeal No. 20090157 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Thomas W. Seller 
Robinson, Seller & Anderson, L.C. 
2500 N. University Ave. 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorney for Appellee 
UTAH 
FH-ED APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 1 0 2008 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 




GEORGE C. LANDRITH, JR., 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Appeal No. 20090157 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C. 
2500 N. University Ave. 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorney for Appellee 
List of Parties Below: 
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association, an unincorporated association. 
George C. Landrith, Jr. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
American Vending Services. Inc.. v. Morse. 881 P.2d 917, 926 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) 52 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772,777 (Utah 1983) 38 
Beaver v. Qwest. Inc.. 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001) 4, 51 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti. 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2007) 54 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001).. 36 
Bruno v. Western Electric Co.. 618 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Colo. 1985) 53 
Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App. 1997) 43 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry. 
886 P.2d 514, 526 (Utah 1994) 4, 50 
Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996) 46 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) 4, 52 
Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771 (UT 1980) 51 
Green v. Louder. 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001) 36 
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council. Inc.. 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999) 44 
IHC Health Service. Inc. v. D&K Management. Inc.. 73 P.3d 320 (Utah 2003) 47 
Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279 (Utah 1972) 43 
Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n. 57 P.3d 1119 45 
(Utah App. 2002) 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.) 
CASES (cont.) PAGE 
John Call Engineering Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 795 P.2d 678, 680 
(Utah cf. App. 1990) 38 
Levanger v. Vincent. 3 P.3d 187 (Utah App. 2000) 45 
Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999) 39 
Management Comm. v. Gravstone Pines. Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 3, 39 
Matter of Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 52 
Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four. Inc.. 2009 UT 43, H 12, 
216 P.3d 352, 355 37 
Norman v. Arnold. 2002 UT 81, ^ 15, 57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002) 34 
Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment, Inc.. 174 P.3d 1 (Utah App. 2007) 34 
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association vs. George Landrith et al.. 
Civil No. 020402193, Fourth District Court, Utah County, Provo Division 10 
Pugh v. Draper City. 2005 UT 12, If 7, 114 P.3d 546 (Utah 2005) 2, 34 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) 46 
Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking. Inc.. 2000 UT 71, ^ 15, 10 P.3d 338.... 34 
(Utah 2000) 




State v. Butterfield. 27 P.3d 1133, 1139 (Utah 2001) 35 
State v. Martin. 44 P.3d 805, 811 (Utah 2002) 3, 35 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (conU 
CASES (cont.) PAGE 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co.. Inc. 912 P.2d 457,461 (Utah App. 1996) 40,45 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) 52 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2) 25,31, 
49,50 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8a-201(2) (Supp. 2005) 43 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-5-103(2)(j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-826 54 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104(a) 35 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 23,35 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702(a) 36 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702(b) 36 
i i i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 26 
DISCUSSION 28 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING LANDRITH'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
THE ASSOCIATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 28 
A. The Association did not organize itself as the George Osmond 
Estates Council. 29 
B. The Association does not operate like the George Osmond 
Estates Council 30 
C. Until recently, the Association didn't claim authority to act as 
the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration... 31 
D. Landrith repeatedly objected to the Association's claim that it 
had authority to act under the Declaration 32 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING RILEY BRATT 
AS AN EXPERT WITNESS. 35 
A. Bratt was qualified as an expert witness under Rule 702. 35 
(i) Bratt satisfied the requirements of Rule 702(a) 36 
(ii) Bratt satisfied the requirements of Rule 702(b) 36 
B. Bratt's testimony was relevant. 37 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (conU 
C. The trial court had previusly recognized Bratt as qualified and 
and Bratt's testimony as relevant. 37 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE 
ASSOCIATION'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 37 
A. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith's defense of failure to mitigate damages. 37 
(i) The Association refused to allow Landrith to fix the hole..38 
(ii) Failure to use less expensive alternative means. 38 
B. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith's defense of material breach by the Association. 40 
(0 No approved plans. 41 
(ii) No notice prior to entry of the Property 41 
(ni)No vote authorizing $1,450.00 special assessment. 41 
(iv) No authorizing resolution. 42 
C. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith's defense of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by the Association. 45 
D. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith" s defense of waiver by the Association. 47 
IV. INTEREST WAS NOT CALCULATED CORRECTLY IN THE 
JUDGMENT. 48 
V. THE ASSOCIATION WAS AWARDED "COSTS" THAT WERE 
NOT RECOVERABLE. 50 
VI. THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMED WAS NOT 
REASONABLE FOR THE SERVICES RENDERED. 52 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (conU 
VII. IF LANDRITH PREVAILS ON THIS APPEAL. LANDRITH 
SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 54 
CONCLUSION 55 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 56 
ADDENDUMS: 
Addendum A - Declaration of Protective Covenants 
Addendum B - Picture of Raven 
Addendum C - December 3, 2002 letter from Landrith to the Association 
Addendum D - Copy of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Addendum E - Ruling, entered January 18, 2007 
Addendum F - Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, entered May 
31,2007 
Addendum G - Special Verdict, dated December 5, 2008 
Addendum H - Judgment (with Revised Calculation of Interest), entered January 13, 2009 
Addendum I - Photocopy of May 15, 2004 Journal Entry by Nevan Anderson evidencing 
agreement between Anderson and Landrith 
VI 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-5-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves a Complaint filed by the Osmond Lane Homeowner 
Association (the "Association") against George Landrith ("Landrith") to recover 
$32,878.02 for two interlocking brick retaining walls constructed by the Association on 
Landrith's property (the "Property") without Landrith's knowledge or consent. The 
Association claimed that it had authority to fix some erosion in Landrith's backyard and 
then require Landrith to reimburse the Association pursuant to a Declaration of Protective 
Covenants (the "Declaration") that was recorded in 1977 against all property within the 
Osmond Estates Subdivision (the "Subdivision"), which included the Property. 
The Declaration authorized the "George Osmond Estates Council" to take certain 
actions with respect to the Property, but made no mention of the Association. Shortly 
after the Complaint was filed, Landrith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss 
the case on the grounds that the Association was not the entity authorized to act under the 
Declarations. The trial court denied that motion and subsequently granted a Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by the Association, finding that Landrith had "ratified" the 
Association's authority to act as the "George Osmond Estates Council" under the 
Declaration. 
During a two-day Jury trial, the trial court excluded Landrith's expert witness from 
testifying that the Association could have resolved the erosion problem by installing a 
rock retaining wall (rather than two interlocking brick retaining walls) for approximately 
$7,252.00. After both parties had rested, the trial court granted a motion for directed 
verdict by the Association to dismiss Landrith's defenses that the Association had failed 
to mitigate its damages, had materially breached the Declaration by failing to comply with 
certain provisions of the Declaration, had waived its right to recover from Landrith and 
had breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court found 
that homeowners associations are not held to the same standard of compliance with the 
terms of a recorded declaration as a "normal corporation." 
The Jury thereafter returned a verdict awarding the Association $33,143.62. The 
Association requested an award of attorney's fees, costs and pre-judgment interest. The 
trial court overruled Landrith's objection to those awards as requested by the Association. 
Thereafter, Landrith filed a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court error in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the Association's authority to act as the "George Osmond Estates 
Council" under the Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness. .See infra, pp.34-35. 
2. Did the trial court error in granting the Association's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the Association's authority to act as the "George Osmond Estates 
Council" under the Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness. Pugh v. Draper City, 
2 
2005 UT 12, If 7, 114 P.3d 546 (Utah 2005). 
3. Did the trial court error in granting the Association's objection at trial as to 
Riley Bratt testifying as an expert witness? Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. 
State v. Martin. 44 P.3d 805, 811 (Utah 2002). 
4. Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed 
verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had failed to mitigate its 
damages? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, 
Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
5. Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed 
verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had materially breached the 
Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, 
Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
6. Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed 
verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had waived its right to recover 
from Landrith? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management Comm. v. Graystone 
Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
7. Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed 
verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had breach its implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management 
Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
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8. Did the trial court error in awarding the Association all attorney's fees 
requested? Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985,991 (Utah 1988). 
9. Did the trial court error in awarding the Association all pre-judgment 
interest requested? Standard of Review: Correctness. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah 
Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 526 (Utah 1994). 
10. Did the trial court error in awarding the Association all costs requested? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Beaver v. Qwest Inc., 2001 UT 81,31 P.3d 
1147 (Utah 2001). 
11. If Landrith prevails on appeal, is Landrith entitled to attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal? 
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
Issues 1 and 2, The issue of the trial court denying Landrith's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
the Association's authority under the Declaration was preserved in the trial court since 
Landrith filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and opposed the Association's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. R. 53-69, 500-545. 
Issue 3. The issue of whether the trial court's errored in excluding Riley Bratt as 
an expert witness was preserved since Landrith opposed the Association's objection to 
Riley Bratt testifying as an expert witness. R. 1548, pp. 289-304. 
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Issues 4-7. The issue of whether the trial court errored in granting the 
Association's motion for directed verdict as to Landrith's four affirmative defenses was 
preserved since Landrith opposed that motion at trial. R. 1548, pp. 375-389. 
Issues 8-10. The issue of whether the trial court errored in its award of interest, 
attorney's fees and costs was preserved since Landrith opposed those requests. R. 1528-
1532 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1977, a Declaration of Protective Covenants (the "Declaration") was 
recorded against all lots in the George Osmond Estates Subdivision, Utah County, Utah 
(the "Subdivision.") See Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1. A copy of the Declaration is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. 
2. The Declaration contemplated the organization of a non-profit corporation 
titled the "George Osmond Estates Council" at a future date: 
"Council" means the George Osmond Estates Council, a Utah 
non-stock, non-profit membership corporation to be organized 
to provide certain facilities and services to the community and 
its inhabitants and visitors. 
Declaration, Section 1.1(c). (Emphasis added.) 
3. The Declaration granted the "George Osmond Estates Council" authority to 
act pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Declaration. Declaration, Sections 3-7. 
4. The "George Osmond Estate Council" was never organized. R. 320-21. 
5. In 1979, an "unincorporated association" identifying itself as the "Osmond 
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Lane Homeowners Association" (the "Association") began acting as a homeowner's 
association in the Subdivision, to wit: addressing common concerns, collecting 
homeowners dues and paying common expenses.1 R. 147. 
6. The Association did not operate the way the George Osmond Estates 
Council was described as operating under the Declaration, for example: (a) The "George 
Osmond Estates Council" was to be organized as a non-profit corporation. Declaration, 
Section 1.1(c). The Association was an unincorporated association. R. 30. (b)The 
"George Osmond Estates Council" was to be governed by a "Board of Managers." 
Declaration, Section 1.1 (J). The Association was governed by president, vice-president 
and secretary. See, e.g., R. 301. (c) The Declaration provided that homeowners were to 
have "voting rights" as "specified in the Articles of Incorporation" for the George 
Osmond Estates Council. Declaration, Section 4.3. The Association has no "Articles of 
Incorporation" and has created no document granting the homeowners any "voting 
rights." (d) The George Osmond Estates Council was to make "annual assessments," 
one-half of which would be due on January 1 and July 1 of each year. Declaration, 
Section 6.6. The Association makes annual assessments that are due in full on January 
10 of each year, (e) The George Osmond Estate Council was to provide copies of its 
*In particular, the roads within the Subdivision are private roads and therefore must 
be maintained at homeowner expense, which includes snow removal in the winter and 
general maintenance. See, e.g., R. 147-318. The Association also undertook to purchase, 
install and maintain a private "gate" to control access to the Subdivision. KL 
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articles of incorporation and the by-laws to all new purchasers of property within the 
Subdivision. Declaration, Section 4.2. The Association does not provide copies of any 
articles of incorporation or any other organizational documents to new purchasers. R. 
528-529. (f) The Association collects unpaid homeowners association fees by filing 
mechanic's liens. See Minutes of Osmond Lane Homeowners Association dated May 7, 
1980, R. 148. ("[E]ach lot owner pay $100.00 for maintaining the center divider. This 
check is to be paid in 30 days or an extra $25.00 late charge for the next 30 day period 
and then a mechanic's lien will be placed on the property.") (Emphasis added.) See also 
May 12, 1980 minutes R. 149. ("If not received [with the next 30 days], a mechanics lien 
will be placed on the property.) (Emphasis added.) The George Osmond Estates Council 
is described as collecting unpaid homeowners association fees through a "continuing 
lien" procedure described under Section 6.8 of the Declaration. Declaration, Section 6.8. 
7. In 1992, George Landrith ("Landrith") purchased the property located at 
892 Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah (the "Property"), which is located within the Subdivision. 
R. 1547, pg. 31. 
8. Between the time Landrith purchased the Property in 1992 and the time 
Landrith sold the Property in 2007, Landrith paid annual dues to the Association as his 
share of the common expenses incurred by the Association for the benefit of homeowners 
within the Subdivision. R. 1547, pg. 31. 
9. Landrith recognized the Association as an association of homeowners 
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within the Subdivision that was organized for the purpose of addressing common 
concerns, collecting homeowner dues, and paying common expenses, but nothing more. 
R. 529, m 7-8. 
10. In particular, Landrith never recognized, consented to, acknowledged or 
ratified the Association as having authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council 
under the Declaration. Id. 
11. Sometime between 1992 and 1994, Landrith forgot to turn off the water to 
the sprinkling system for the Property, resulting in freezing, cracking of some of the 
irrigation pipes, and subsequent flooding in his backyard. R. 1547, pp. 52-53. 
12. The backyard of the Property runs along the top of a steep and deep raven. 
See Defendant's Exhibit 42, attached hereto as Addendum B, which is a picture of the 
raven which runs behind the backyard of the Property. 
13. When the flooding occurred in the backyard of the Property, the water 
drained from the backyard into the raven and caused some erosion at the top of the raven 
in the southeast corner of the Property (this erosion is sometimes referred to as the 
"hole.") 
14. In July 1998, the Association requested that certain repairs be made to the 
Property, and provided Landrith with an "Invoice" listing the cost of making each repair.2 
2The "Invoice" showed an "amount due" for different items. This "Invoice" did 
not reflect work actually done, but was only the Association's estimate of the cost of 
making the repairs requested. 
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See Defendant's Exhibit 37. 
15. Landrith made some of the repairs requested, but at a much lower cost than 
the cost listed by the Association in the "Invoice" and, in some cases, using an alternative 
and less expensive means of fixing the problem.3 
16. At that time, the Association also requested that Landrith repair the erosion 
at top of the raven in the southeast corner of the Property by "filling the hole with dirt," 
listing a cost of $2,600.00. Id 
17. Landrith believed that the erosion was simply part of the terrain and did not 
require repair and therefore Landrith did not repair the erosion at the top of the southeast 
corner of the Property. R. 1548, pp. 340-41, 343-44. ("They talked about the steep 
terrain. That's the terrain. That's the nature of the terrain... When you look at the terrain, 
the hole is just one more messy part of the terrain. The whole terrain is a mess. So what 
was the hole? Just another part of the mess.") 
18. In 2001, the Association requested that Landrith rebrick the brick wall in 
front of the Property. R. 1548, pg. 347. 
3For example, the Association demanded that Landrith repair his sprinklers, listing 
a cost of $2,650.00. R. 1547, pg. 308; R. 1548, R. 342. Landrith repaired the sprinklers 
for $400.00. Id The Association demanded that Landrith replace some "dead grass," 
listing a cost of $2,900. R. 1547, pp. 309-10; R. 1548, R. 342. Landrith had four 
landscapers come and look at the "dead grass." Id at 310. Based on those meetings, 
Landrith determined that the grass was not dead and did not replace the grass. Id "[T]he 
grass grew back." Id. The Association demanded that Landrith "stucco [his] entire 
home," listing a cost of $9,016.00. R. 1547, pg. 310; R. 1548, R. 342. Rather than 
"stucco" his house, Landrith had his house painted for $1,500. Id 
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19. Landrith repaired the brick wall to the satisfaction of the Association, using 
an alternative and less expensive means of repairing the brick wall.4 
20. The Association had incurred $604.00 attorney's fees in demanding that 
Landrith re-brick the wall in front of the Property. R. 521-22. 
21. After Landrith had repaired the brick wall, the Association demanded that 
Landrith reimburse the Association for the $604.00 in costs and attorneys fees incurred by 
the Association in requesting that Landrith repair the brick wall. Id, 
22. Landrith refused to reimburse the $604.00. IcL 
23. On January 9, 2002, the Association filed a Notice of Lien against the 
Property for the $604.00 in "costs and attorneys fees" stating that the Association 
intended to "claim and hold a lien" against the Property "pursuant to the Declaration." Id. 
24. On May 28, 2002, the Association filed an action to foreclose on that 
Notice of Lien pursuant to the Declaration in Osmond Lane Homeowners Association vs. 
George Landrith et aL Civil No. 020402193, Fourth District Court, Utah County, Provo 
Division (the "2002 Action.") R. 540-541. 
25. Based on a review of all minutes of the Association from 1979 through 
2002, the recording of the 2002 Notice of Lien and the commencement of the 2002 
Action was the first time the Association had taken action against any homeowner 
4The Association gave Landrith three bids to the brick wall re-brick, the lowest of 
which was $8,900.00. R. 1548, pg. 347. Rather than re-brick the front wall, Landrith 
stuccoed the brick wall at a cost of $800.00. R. 1548, pg. 348. 
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claiming authority to act under the Declaration. R. 147-317 (where the Association has 
attached all minutes and financial records for the Association from 1979 through 2004.) 
26. In his affidavit, Nevan Anderson, the president of the Association, did not 
identify any action taken by the Association against any homeowner, other than Landrith, 
in which the Association claimed authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council 
under the Declaration. See Affidavit of Nevan Anderson, President of the Association. 
R. 320-322. 
27. On June 17, 2002, the Association obtained an Ex Parte Order authorizing 
service by publication on Landrith. R. 358. 
28. By July 30, 2002, Landrith had not received actual notice of the 2002 
Action and the Association obtained a Default Judgment against Landrith. Id R. 358. 
29. On August 15, 2002, the Court issued a Writ of Execution ordering the sale 
of the Property to satisfy the $604.00 in costs and attorney's fees owed under the Default 
Judgment. Id R. 358. 
30. By September 5, 2002, Landrith had become aware of the 2002 Action, and 
on that date filed a pro se written objection to the Writ of Execution. R. 358, 540. 
31. On September 20, 2002, a hearing was held on Landrith's objection to the 
Writ of Execution and Landrith appeared pro se and objected to the Association's 
authority to file the 2002 Notice of Lien or to file the 2002 Action against him: 
There was no meeting, there's no record of any meeting being 
held with other members of the association whereby [the 
11 
Association President] discussed this and got approval [to file 
the 2002 Notice of Lien or 2002 Action.] 
R. 375 (Transcript of September 20, 2002 hearing, pg. 2.) 
32. The Court refused to consider Landrith's objection on the merits because a 
Default Judgment had already been entered. R. 371-75; pp. 2, 8, 11. ("You know, you're 
raising this a little late...[Y]ou're too late. You had 30 days to appeal it or move to set it 
aside...") 
33. Landrith paid the $604.00 to avoid foreclosure of the Property. R. 540. 
34. During the summer of 2002, without Landrith's knowledge or consent, the 
Association provided $1,113.50 in "lawn and yard maintenance" to the Property. R. 539-
540. 
35. The Association demanded that Landrith reimburse the Association for 
$1,113.50. R. 539-540. 
36. Landrith refused to reimburse the $1,113.50. R. 539-540. 
37. On November 14, 2002, the Association filed a Notice of Lien on the 
Property for $1,113.50. R. 539-540. 
38. On December 3, 2002, Landrith paid $1,113.50 to the Association under 
protest - stating in an accompanying letter to the Association that "my payment of this 
invoice is NOT any agreement on my part of the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice." R. 
539-540; 516. See December 3, 2002 letter from Landrith to the Association, attached 
hereto as Addendum C. R. 516. 
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39. In 2003, Landrith moved out of the Property and relocated to Bountiful, 
Utah. R. 1547. 
40. Landrith began trying to sell the Property and notified Nevan Anderson 
("Anderson"), then the president of the Association, that he was trying to sell the 
Property. R. 1547, pg. 51; R. 1548, pp. 314-15; R. 1548, pp. 315. 
41. In the spring of 2004, without Landrith's consent, the Association made 
$5,103.00 in repairs to the Property. R. 1548, pg. 317. 
42. Upon receiving a bill for $5,103.00 from the Association, Landrith was 
"appalled" and "upset" by the Association's actions. R. 1548, pg. 317. 
43. On May 15, 2004, Anderson recorded notes in his journal memorializing a 
telephone conversation between Anderson and Landrith in which Anderson and Landrith 
agreed that Landrith would pay the $5,103.00, but only on the condition that the 
Association would make no more repairs to the Property without "prior notice and 
discussion with [Landrith]:" 
Landrith called about the [$5,103.00] bill for work on the 
house. Very unhappy. We agreed that...he will pay the bill, 
although he thinks it is to high. I will send him a letter stating 
that repairs in the future will only be done with my approval 
and prior notice and discussion with [Landrith.] 
R. 1548, pg. 316, Defendant's Exhibit 29. (Emphasis added.) 
44. Landrith thereafter paid the $5,103.00 "bill," but only on the condition set 
forth above and "with strong objection" to the Association's actions in making $5,103.00 
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in repairs to the Property without Landrith's consent. R. 1548, pp. 322-323. 
45. In early July 2004, Landrith and Anderson had a meeting at the Property in 
which Anderson told Landrith that the "hole" in the backyard needed to be fixed. R. 
1548, pp. 324, 345. 
46. At that meeting, Anderson told Landrith that to fix "the hole would cost 
$100,000, and therefore suggested that in order to avoid the $100,000 cost that [Landrith] 
sell him [Anderson] the house for $200,000." R. 1548, pp. 324, 345. 
47. If Landrith sold Anderson the Property for $200,000, Landrith would then 
be "free of the Association and wouldn't have to worry about the hole anymore." R. 
1548, pp. 324,345. 
48. Landrith rejected Anderson's offer to purchase the Property for $200,000. 
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49. On July 23, 2004, Landrith and Anderson again met at the Property, and this 
time Landrith brought "a man...to put dirt in the hole." R. 1548, pg. 345; 1547, pp. 127-
28. 
50. At that meeting, Anderson "reiterated" that it was going to cost $100,000 to 
fix the "hole" and told Landrith that "filling [the hole] with dirt was no longer 
acceptable." R. 1548, pp. 346. 
51. Three days later - on July 26, 2004 - Landrith listed the Property for sale 
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with a real estate agent "as is" for $475,000.5 R. 1548, pg. 325; R. 1548, pg. 346. 
52. In November 2004, the Association retained Steve Smith, an engineer, to 
begin engineering work to repair the "hole" on the Property. R. 1548, pp. 165-167. 
53. Between November, 2004, and August 2005, the Association constructed 
two retaining walls in the southeast corner of the Property - at a cost of $32,878.92. R. 
1548, pp. 163-264. 
54. This construction was done without Landrith's knowledge or consent. R. 
1548, pg. 328-329. (I "never had any idea the work was going on because I was 
absolutely stunned when I saw...that the work had been done.") 
55. Anderson testified at trial that he ordered the construction done because he 
was concerned about the "safety" of "children" that live in the neighborhood. R. 1547, 
pg. 73. 
56. The erosion was at the top of the raven in the southeast corner of Landrith's 
backyard and could not be seen from the street. R. 1548, pp. 340-41, 343-44. 
57. There was no testimony at trial that anyone had ever seen children on the 
5In listing the Property "as is," Landrith anticipated that the buyer would resolve 
the issue of the "hole" with the Association. R. 1548, pp. 330-31. Landrith prepared a 
letter to be given to prospective purchasers stating that the "Association had a problem 
with the hole, so they would be fully aware of it." R. 1458, pp. 330-331. On January 10, 
2007, Landrith sold the Property for $445,000. R. 528. Because of the Notice of Lien 
filed against the Property, the title company closing the sale of the Property escrowed 
$120,000 of the sales proceeds in the event the Association's lien foreclosure action was 
successful. 
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Property. R. 1547, pp. 73-74; R. 1547, pp. 64-157; R. 1548, pp. 163-368. 
58. There was no testimony at trial that anyone had ever seen children near the 
Property. Id. 
59. There was no testimony at trial that Provo City or any other governmental 
agency had ever found the "hole" to violate any health or safety code (or any other code.) 
IdL 
60. The construction of the two walls involved extensive work on the Property, 
including construction of a ramp along the west side of the Property and behind the 
Property to allow construction equipment to access the southeast comer of the Property: 
We had a skid loader. We had to run a skid loader along the 
home and dump it into the hole there on that - - on the east 
side, and then he would back up, and we created a ramp on 
the west side of the home and had to climb that ramp, and we 
had the delivery truck that delivered the dirt there on the 
driveway so it was off of the lane and not too much problem 
for everybody else.. 
R. 1548, pg. 242. 
61. The two retaining walls were constructed using keystone interlocking 
bricks. R. 1548, pp. 168,253-54. 
62. After the work was completed, the Association sent Landrith a letter 
demanding reimbursement of $32,878.92 for construction of the two retaining walls. R. 
1548, pg. 329. 
63. Landrith refused to pay the $32,878.92. 
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64. On August 2U5 2005, a letter was sent lo all I pi < >pu h < >\\ ners, except 
Landrith, assessing them $1,450.00 to pay for the work done on the Property. R. 1548, 
pg. 328. 
65. On January 13, 2006, the Association recorded a Notice of Lien against the 
Property for $32,878.92 in expenses itu titled in icpairing the erosion, 11 aiming an intent 
to "hold and claim a lien pursuant to the Declaration." R. 23-24; Plaintiffs Exhibit 24. 
66. On February 10, 2006, the Association filed the Complaint in this case, 
seeking to foreclose on the Property for $32,878.92, and claiming authority to foreclose 
on the Notice of Line pursuant to the Declaration. R. 1-30. 
67. Under the Declaration, the George Osmond Estates Council had to first give 
"reasonable notice" to Landrith before entering the Property to perform any maintenance: 
For purposes of solely performing the maintenance required 
in this article. The Council through its duty authorized agents 
or employees shall have the right, after reasonable notice to 
the owner, to enter upon any parcel. 
Section 6.13. (Emphasis added.) 
68. The Association did not give Landrith any notice that it was entering the 
Property prior to construction of the two retaining walls. R. 1548, pg. 349. 
69. Under the Declaration, the Board of Managers of the George Osmond 
Estates Council "may levy a special assessment" for the "cost of any construction or 
reconstruction," but only if "such assessment shall have the assert of two-thirds (2/3) of 
the homeowners and that notice of such a meeting shall be sent to all members at least 
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thirty (30) days in advance of the meeting:" 
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by Section 
6.3 hereof, the Board of Managers of the [George Osmond 
Estates Council] may levy a special assessment for the 
purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any 
construction or reconstruction, unexpected repair or 
replacement of any capital improvements upon the Common 
Area, including the necessary fixtures and personal property 
related thereto, provided that any such assessment shall have 
the assert of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of the [George 
Osmond Estates Council] who are voting in person or by 
proxy at a meeting duly called for this purpose, written notice 
of which shall be sent to all members at least thirty (30) days 
in advance and shall set forth the purpose of the meeting. 
Declaration 6.4. (Emphasis added.) 
70. Under the Declaration, no assessments "shall be used for capital 
improvements or expenditures" unless approved by a vote of "two-thirds of the 
membership of the Council and mortgagee:" 
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital 
improvements or expenditures unless approved by a vote of 
two-thirds of the membership of the Council and mortgagees. 
Declaration, Section 6.2. 
71. The Association did not hold any meeting or conducted any vote to 
authorize the construction of the two retaining walls on the Property, or to authorize the 
levy of the $1,450.00 "special assessment" (or any other special assessment) to fund the 
construction of the two retaining walls on the Property. R. 1547, pp. 149-51. 
72. Under the Declaration, no "wall" "shall be constructed" unless the "plans 
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and specifications" for the wall have first been approved "in writing" by the Architectural 
and Planning Control Board of the George Osmond Estate Council: 
No building, outbuilding, fence, wall, or other improvements 
that are not already located on such property shall be 
constructed, erected or maintained, nor shall any additions 
thereto, or alteration therein, be made until plans and 
specifications showing the design, color, location, materials, 
landscaping and such other information relating to such 
improvement as the [Architectural and Planning Control 
Board of the George Osmond Estate Council] may reasonably 
require shall have been submitted to and approved by the 
[Architectural and Planning Control Board of the George 
Osmond Estate Council] in writing. 
Declaration, Section 3.3. 
73. The Association did not approve in writing (or otherwise) the "plans and 
specifications" for the two retaining walls constructed on the Property. R. 1547, pp. 149-
151.6 
74. Under the Declaration, the due date for any "special assessment" is to be 
fixed "in the resolution authorizing such assessment:" 
The due date of any special assessments under Section 6.4 
6During direct examination, Anderson refused to directly answer the question of 
whether there had been any approval of the plans and specifications for the two retaining 
walls on the Property. Anderson claimed that the letter assessing all homeowners $1,450 
was sent out "by the members of the architectural board" and constituted "written 
approval" of the plans and specifications for the two walls. R. 1547, pg. 150. That letter 
was not introduced as an exhibit at trial. That letter was dated August 20, 2005 - after 
construction of the two retaining walls had been completed - and therefore could not have 
constituted prior written approval of the plans and specifications for the two retaining 
walls. R. 1548, pg. 328. 
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hereof shall be fixed in the resolution authorizing such 
assessment. 
Declaration, Section 6.5. (Emphasis added.) 
75. The Association did not adopt any resolution authorizing the construction of 
the two retaining walls, authorizing the $1,450.00 special assessments to pay for the two 
retaining walls or "fixing" the "due dates" for payment of the $1,450.00 special 
assessment. R. 1547, pp. 151-155. 
76. Under the Declaration, any "exterior maintenance" expense incurred by the 
George Osmond Estates Council with respect to a specific property was to be assessed as 
part of the "annual assessment charge" against that property, with one-half of that "annual 
assessment charge" to be due on January 1 and one-half to be due on July 1 of the next 
year: 
The cost of such exterior maintenance shall be assessed 
against the parcel upon which such maintenance is done, and 
shall then be added to and became part of the annual 
assessment charge or charges... 
The annual assessment provided for herein shall be payable in 
semiannual installments, one-half of each of the annual 
assessments on the first day of January and July of each year. 
Declaration, Section 6.6. 
77. The Association did not assess the $32,878.92 charge for the two retaining 
walls as part of the 2006 annual maintenance assessment for the Property, or assess one-
half of the $32,878.92 charge for the two retaining walls on January 1, 2006 and one-half 
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on July 1, 2006, but demanded immediate payment in full R. 1548, pg. 350. 
78. On September 18, 2006, Landrith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
dismiss this case on the grounds that the only entity authorized to act under the 
Declaration was a nonprofit corporation entitled the "George Osmond Estates Council" -
which had never been organized - and that the Association was not authorized under the 
Declaration to act in any way with respect to the Property. R. 53-69. 
79. On January 18, 2007, the Court denied Landrith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 396-400. A copy of thai Killing is attached hereto as Addendum E. 
80. in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court relied on 
Swan Creek Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne. 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 
2006), finding that George Landrith had "ratified" the Association's authority to act as the 
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. Ruling, dated January 18, ..MI07. 
R. 396-400, attached hereto as Addendum E. 
81. On February 16, 2007, the Association filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to all issues in the case, including a request that the Court affirm the 
Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council tunic i I he 
Declaration. R. 401-475. 
82. In response to the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment, Landrith 
submitted detailed evidence of his repeated opposition to the Association's authority to 
act under the Declaration. R. ^00-Mi. 
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83. Landrith also submitted the Affidavit of Riley Bratt ("Bratt"), an employee 
of Bratt, Inc., a licensed landscapes design and excavation company, who had been 
building rock retaining walls for seven years. R. 680-682. 
84. Bratt testified that the erosion problem in the southeast corner of the 
Landrith Property could have been resolved by installing a rock wall (rather than a 
keystone interlocking brick wall), at a base cost of $7,252.00, that "could increase by up 
to an additional $4,200." Id 
85. Mr. Landrith also filed his own affidavit, averring that the "work performed 
by the [Association] exceeded the scope of work required to cure any legitimate safety 
and/or general maintenance issue that may have existed" and that the "amount charged by 
the [Association] is much more than the amount needed to satisfactorily repair any 
erosion problem that may have existed in my backyard." R. 529-530. 
86. The trial court granted the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
to the Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the 
Declaration, again finding that Landrith had ratified the Association's authority to act as 
the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. R. 706-708. A copy of that 
Order is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
87. The trial court found, however, that "the affidavits of Mr. Landrith and Mr. 
Bratt put [at] issue the appropriateness of the remedy and the appropriateness of the 
expense:" 
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I believe the affidavits oi Mr. Landrith and Mi. Bratt put into 
issue, into dispute the appropriateness of the remedy and the 
appropriateness of the expense...I simply believe there's a 
factual dispute, I think that's an issue that cannot be resolved 
on summary judgment and I'm going to deny summary 
judgment [on that issue]. 
Transcript of April 26, 2007 hearing, pp. 38-39. 
88. On December 4 and 5, 2008, a Jury trial was held in this matter. 
89. At the trial, Bratt listened to the testimony of Kirk Johnson, the individual 
that installed the two retaining walls, as to how those two retaining walls were 
constructed. R. 1548, pg. 292. 
90. Prior to trial, Bratt had also reviewed the engineering plans that Kirk 
Johnson used to construct the two interlocking brick retaining walls. R. 1548, pg. 292. 
91. Prior to trial, Bratt also physically visited the site to determine the 
feasability and cost of installing a rock wall to "resolve the erosion problem. R. 1:>48, 
pp. 287-88. 
92. At trial, Bratt attempted to testify that a rock retaining wall would have 
resolved the erosion problem and would have been a much less expensive alternative. R. 
1548, pp. 289-304. 
93. The Association objected to that testimony on the grounds that Bratt was 
not qualified to testify as an expert under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and that 
Bratt's testimony was not relevant to any issue in this case. Id. 
94. The Court granted that objection on both grounds. R. 1548, pp. 289-304. 
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95. After both sides had rested, the Association moved for a directed verdict on 
Landrith's defenses that the Association had materially breached the Declaration, had 
breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, had waived its right to 
recover the cost of constructing the two retaining walls and had failed to mitigate its 
damages. R. 1548, pg. 375. 
96. The trial court granted that motion for directed verdict as to all four 
defenses. R. 1548, pp. 381-82, 387-89. 
97. In dismissing Landrith's defense that the Association had materially 
breached the Declaration, the trial court found that the homeowners associations are not 
held to the same standard of compliance with recorded declarations as a "normal 
corporation:" 
The other thing is that in the case law the appellate courts 
have not treated a homeowner's association with the 
specificity and with requirements of a normal corporation. 
They've treated them more in an equitable fashion as it relates 
to intent as opposed to, you know, whether or not there was 
formal minutes kept and you know, a variety of things that 
way. 
R. 1548, pg. 373. 
98. After a short deliberation, the Jury returned a verdict awarding the 
Association $33,143.62, answering each question 8-0 in favor of the Association. R. 
1456-57. A copy of that Special Verdict is attached hereto as Addendum G. 
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99. The difference between the amounl staled in tin Nnlm ol 1 ini 
($32,878.92) and the amount awarded in the verdict ($33,143.62) were a May 15, 2006 
and a July 15, 2008 invoice from Rainmaker of Utah in the amount of $74.20 and 
$161.00, respectively, for subsequent work the Association ordered on the Pioperty -
again withoul I Jiidrith's knowledge or consent. 
100. On December 15, 2008, the Association filed a Revised Calculation of 
Interest requesting interest in the amount of $10,627.75.7 R. 1509-1511. 
101. The Association requested interest "from the date the debt was incurred" 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section ii>-l-l(2) at a rate of 10% per annum, lor a 
total of $10,627.75 in interest, rather than pursuant to method of calculating interest set 
forth in the Declaration. R. 1510, 1520. 
102. Landrith objected to the Association's method of calculating of interest, on 
the grounds that interest should be calculated pursuant to the provisions of the 
Declaration rather than pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2), which 
would have resulted in $1,750.00 less pre-judgment interest. R. 1528-32. 
103 Without explanation, the court overruled Landrith's objection and awarded 
the Association the amount of interest it requested - $10,627.75. R. 1522-24. 
7On December 12, 2008, the Association filed a Notice of Calculation of Interest. 
R. 1468-1505. The only difference between the Notice of Calculation of interest and the 
Revised Notice of Calculation of Interest was that in that the later the Association added 
two additional months of interest - November and December 2008. Cf R. 1468-1505 and 
R. 1509-1511. 
25 
104. The Declaration provides that in the event a judgment is obtained, such 
judgment shall include "reasonable attorney's fees." Declaration, Section 6.8. 
105. The Association filed a claim for $59,83 L90 in attorney's fees. R. 1476-
95. 
106. Landrith objected to reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees 
claimed by the Association. R. 1528-32. 
107. Without explanation, the Court overruled Landrith's objection and awarded 
the Association all attorney's fees requested ($59,831.90.) R. 1522-1524. 
108. The Association claimed $1,813.02 in costs. R. 1476-95. 
109. Landrith objected to $403.82 in costs. R. 1528-1532. 
110. In response to that objection, the Association stated that "it would accept a 
reduction of costs...in the amount of $329.89," leaving a balance of $1,485.13. R. 1514. 
111. The Association nevertheless submitted a form of Judgment which included 
the full amount of costs claimed - $1,815.02 - which the Court granted without 
explanation. R. 1522-1524. 
112. On January 13, 2009, a Judgment was entered in favor of the Association. 
Id. A copy of that Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum H. 
113. On February 5, 2009, Landrith filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 1540. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court errored in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment to 
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dismiss the Complaii it oi i tl le gi 01 11 ids that tl i.e Association did not have authority to act as 
the "George Osmond Estates Council" under the Declaration. The trial court also errored 
in granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment and finding that, even if all 
facts were viewed in a light most favorable to Landnth. dial I here was no "material issue 
of fact" that 1andritl1111id ratified the Association's authority to act as the George 
Osmond Estate Council under the Declaration. 
The Association is separate and distinct from the "George Osmond Estates 
Council" and operates in a manner signifi.can.tly differei it flt.ui (lit: manner in w Inch the 
George Osmond Estates Council is described as operating under the Declaration. 
Landrith has repeatedly objected to the Association's claim that it had authority to act as 
the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. 
The trial court errored in precluding Riley Bratt ("Bratt") from testifvinr ial as 
an expert witness as to a less expensive alternative method of resolving the erosion 
problem. The trial court also errored in granting the Association's motion for directed 
verdict as to Landrith's defenses that the Association had failed to mitigate its damages, 
had material!)'11 breached the Declaration by failing to coi t ipl> w ith certain, applicable 
provisions of the Declaration, had waived its right for reimbursement and had breached 
its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, the trial court errored in 
overruling all of Landrith's objections as to the costs, interest and attorney's fees claimed 
by the Association. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING LANDRITH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Landrith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss the Complaint on the 
grounds that the only entity authorized to act under the Declaration was the George 
Osmond Estates Council, a non-profit corporation - not the Association - which is the 
plaintiff in this case. In response, the Association claimed that Landrith had ratified the 
Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the 
Declaration. The trial court agreed with the Association, relying on Swancreek Village 
Homeowners Association vs. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 2006). The trial court 
subsequently granted the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment finding that there 
was "no material issue of fact in dispute" as to the fact that Landrith had "ratified" the 
Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the 
Declaration. 
In Swancreek, the homeowners association identified in a recorded declaration was 
incorporated in 1979. In 1986, that corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the State 
of Utah for failure to make an annual filing. In 1988, because that homeowners 
association waited more than one year after its dissolution to try to reinstate the old 
corporation, and therefore the old corporation could not be reinstated, the association 
reincorporated under the same name and continued to operate in the same manner as the 
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first corporation. In 20( lomeowner tried to avoid pa,)/ n lei it of 1: i :>:t i leowner 
association dues by claiming that the second corporation didn't have authority to act 
under the declaration since it was "technically" a different corporation than the 
corporation originally incorporated pursuant to the declaration. 
The Swancreek Court, foi 11 id that wl lere pi operty owner s 1 lav e "treated on 
association as one with authority to act" pursuant to the terms of a recorded declaration, 
"they ratify the association's authority to act" under the declaration: 
Where property owners have treated an association as one 
with authority to govern and impose assessments 
contemplated under the terms of a duly recorded governing 
declaration, they ratify its authority to act. 
Id at 1128. 
The Swancreek Court held that finding such a ratification "prevents parties from avoiding 
valid objections due to technicalities:" 
The availability of equitable relief helps ensure that justice is 
met and prevents parties from avoiding valid obligations due 
to technicalities. 
Id at 1129. 
The facts in this case are much different tl lai I those in Swancreek. In this case, 
there was no factual basis for finding that the Association ever had authority to act as the 
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration, or that any "ratification" had 
taken place by Landrith. 
A. The Association did not organize itself as the George Osmond Estates Council. 
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The Declarations were recorded in 1977 and contemplated that a non-profit 
corporation titled the "George Osmond Estates Council" would be created at a future 
date. That entity was never created. Instead, in approximately 1979, an "unincorporated 
association" identifying itself as the "Osmond Lane Homeowners Association" began 
acting as a "homeowner's association" in the Subdivision, to wit: addressing common 
concerns, collecting homerowner dues and paying for common expenses. If the 
Association had intended to be the "George Osmond Estates Council" described in the 
Declaration the Association would have organized itself as the "George Osmond Estates 
Council" as described in the Declaration - a non-profit organization called the "George 
Osmond Estates Council." 
Unlike Swancreek, the Association never was the entity authorized to act under the 
Declaration, and at no time organized itself to be the entity described in the Declaration. 
This is not a "technicality" of a corporation being dissolved for failure to make an annual 
filing and then reincorporating under the same name because the time to reinstate had 
passed. The Association intentionally chose not to organize itself as the entity authorized 
to act under the Declaration. 
B. The Association does not operate like the George Osmond Estates Council. 
The Association does not operate the way the George Osmond Estates Council is 
described as operating under the Declaration. The "George Osmond Estates Council" 
was to be organized as a non-profit corporation. The Association is an unincorporated 
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association. I he "George Osnioi id Estates Council" was to be governed by "Board of 
Managers." The Association is governed by president, vice-president and secretary. The 
Declaration provided that homeowners were to have "voting rights" as "specified in the 
Articles of Incorporation" for the George Osmond Estates Council, The Associatioii has 
no "Articles :)fIiicorporation" arid has created no document granting the homeowners any 
"voting rights." The George Osmond Estates Council was to make "annual assessments/' 
one-half of which would be due on January 1 and July 1 of each year. The Association 
makes annual assessments that are due in fin January 10 of each year. The George 
Osmond Estate Council was to provide copies of its articles of incorporation and the by-
laws to all new purchasers of property within the Subdivision. The Association does not 
provide copies of any articles of incorporation or any other organizational documents to 
new purchasers. Even after the Association won at trial, tl le < Association relied oi I I Itah 
Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2) for the method of calculating pre-judgment interest, 
rather Sections 6.6, 6.8 and 6.12 of the Declaration. The Association has not even tried to 
operate as the George Osmond Estates Council is described as operating under the 
Declaration. 
In Swancreek, the homeowners association operated as the homeowners 
association that was described in the recorded declarations. 
C. Until recently, the Association didn't claim authority to act as the George 
Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. 
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Since it began operating in 1979, the Association has filed "mechanic's liens" to 
collect unpaid homeowners association fees, rather than collect them pursuant to the 
Declaration. Other than Landrith, the Association records identify no other property 
owner against whom the Association has taken any action, claiming authority to act as the 
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. In his Affidavit, even Anderson 
never claims that the Association has ever taken any action against any homeowner, other 
than Landrith, claiming authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the 
Declaration. 
In Swancreek, since its inception the homeowner's association had asserted 
authority to act as the homeowner's association described in the recorded declaration. 
D. Landrith repeatedly objected to the Association's claim that it had authority to 
act under the Declaration. 
Since purchasing the Property in 1992, Landrith has recognized the Association as 
a homeowner's association organized to address common concerns, collect homeowner 
dues, and pay common expenses, but nothing more. In particular, Landrith has never 
acknowledged, consented to or otherwise ratified the Association as having authority to 
act under the Declaration. 
The first time the Association took any action against Landrith claiming authority 
to act under the Declaration was in 2002 when the Association filed the 2002 Notice of 
Lien against the Property and commenced the 2002 Action to collect $604.00 in costs and 
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attorney's fees. The Association served Landrith by publication and obtained a Default 
Judgment. At the Writ of Execution hearing, Landrith disputed the Association's 
authority to file the Notice of Lien or commence the 2002 Action. The Court refused to 
consider Landrith's arguments on the merits inasmuch as a Default Judgment had been 
entered. 
On November 14, 2002, the Association filed another Notice of Lien against 
Landrith's property for $1,113.50 for "yard and lawn maintenance." Once again, 
Landrith objected. On December 3, 2002, Landrith paid that amount to the Association 
under protest - stating in the accompanying letter that "my payment of this invoice is 
NOT any agreement on my part of the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice." See 
Addendum C hereto. 
In 2004, the Association performed $5,103.00 in repairs to the Property - again 
without Landrith's consent. In a May 15, 2004, telephone conversation between Anderson 
and Landrith, Landrith agreed to pay $5,103.00, but only after the Association had agreed 
that it would make no future repairs to the Property without "prior notice and discussions 
with [Landrith.]" See Addendum I hereto. 
Each time the Association has taken action against Landrith claiming authority to 
act under the Declaration, Landrith has objected. Landrith has recognized the Association 
as what it is - an unincorporated association of homeowners in the Subdivision that is 
addressing common homeowners concerns, collecting annual dues and paying common 
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expenses of homeowners within the Subdivision - but nothing more. Landrith's payment 
of annual dues to the Association does not mean that Landrith recognized the Association 
as having authority to act under the Declaration. It is not necessary to have authority to 
act under a recorded declaration to collect homeowners dues. The Association enforces 
collection of unpaid homeowners dues by filing mechanics liens, not pursuant to the 
Declaration. 
The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed "for correctness, 
granting no deference to the [district] court." Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ^ } 7, 114 
P.3d 546 (Utah 2005). "[SJummary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, % 15, 57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002). In 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to be reviewed in 
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, 
Inc., 2000 UT 71,115, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000). 
Where a motion for summary judgment is denied, and the issue raised therein is 
considered at trial, the appellate court will not consider whether the trial court errored in 
denying the motion for summary judgment. Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 
174 P.3d 1 (Utah App. 2007.) In this case, where Landrith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied but the issue raised therein was not considered at trial since the 
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on the same issue was granted, the trial 
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court's denial of Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment should also be reviewed for 
correctness. In reviewing the trial court's denial of Landrith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, based on the clear distinction between the facts in Swancreek and the facts in 
this case, the trial court errored in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court also errored in granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Viewing all "facts and inferences" in a light most favorable to Landrith, at best there was 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Landrith ever ratified the Association's 
claim that it had authority to act under the Declaration. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING RILEY BRATT AS AN 
EXPERT WITNESS. 
The trial court errored in excluding Bratt's testimony at trial on the grounds that he 
was not qualified as an expert witness under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
that his testimony was not relevant. 
A. Bratt was qualified as an expert witness under Rule 702. 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides the standard for admissibility of 
expert testimony. A copy of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is attached hereto as 
Addendum D. "The decision whether to admit or exclude expert testimony generally 
involves a preliminary issue of fact for the court under Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 
104(a)... The trial court's admission of expert testimony is within the trial court's 
discretion and its ruling will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion." See, e.g., State v. 
Martin. 44 P.3d 805, 811 (Utah 2002); State v. Butterfield. 27 P.3d 1133, 1139 (Utah 
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2001); Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that an expert evidence ruling will be 
reversed if erroneous, especially where the trial court has imposed too high a burden for 
admissibility. See e ^ , Green v. Louder. 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001). 
(i) Bratt satisfied the requirements of Rule 702(a). Under Rule 702(a), 
Bratt had to be "qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to 
testify as to whether a rock retaining wall to resolve the erosion problem and the cost 
thereof. Utah R. Evid. 702(a). In this case, Bratt was employed by Bratt, Inc., a licensed 
landscaping, design and excavation company, and had been constructing rock retaining 
walls for seven years. Bratt was clearly qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, 
education, or training" to testify as to whether a rock retaining wall would have resolved 
the erosion problem on the Property and the cost thereof. 
(ii) Bratt satisfied the requirements of Rule 702(b). The trial court must 
also determine whether Bratt's testimony meets a "threshold" showing that his methods 
and testimony (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have 
been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Utah R. Evid. 702(b). In this case, Bratt 
visited the site where the erosion took place, reviewed the plans and specifications 
prepared by the Association's engineer to repair the erosion, and listened to the testimony 
at trial of Kirk Johnson, the individual that actually installed the "interlocking brick" 
retaining wall. Clearly, Bratt had satisfied this "threshold." 
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B. Bratt's testimony was relevant. 
Bratt's testimony was relevant to Landrith's defenses that the Association had 
breached its duty to mitigate damages. The relevance of Bratt's testimony is discussed 
below in the section discussing that defense. 
C. The trial court had previously recognized Bratt as qualified and Bratt's 
testimony as relevant. 
Prior to trial, the trial court recognized Bratt's testimony as admissible and 
relevant. In denying the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, the 
court found that "the affidavits of Mr. Landrith and Mr. Bratt put [at] issue the 
appropriateness of the remedy and the appropriateness of the expense." The law of the 
case provides that "decision[s] made on issuefs] during one stage of a case are binding on 
successive stages of the same litigation. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 
2009 UT 43, ^ 12, 216 P.3d 352, 355 (internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court's 
reversal at trial of its prior ruling on this same issue - without explanation - was without 
basis and should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S 
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
A. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
failure to mitigate damages. 
Under the defense of failure to mitigate damages, the Association had a duty to 
"minimize" its damages resulting from Landrith's alleged failure to fix the erosion. John 
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Call Engineering. Inc. v. Manti Citv Corp.. 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah cf. App. 1990) The 
Association may not recover damages that it could have avoided with reasonable effort. 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). The 
Association breached its duty to mitigate damages by failing to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate its damages. 
(i) The Association refused to allow Landrith to fix the hole. On July 23, 
2004, both Landrith and Anderson met in Landrith's background. Landrith brought a 
contractor to "put dirt in the hole." This is the solution that the Association had 
previously requested. At that meeting, Anderson stated that this means of repairing the 
erosion was "no longer acceptable." The Association breached its duty to mitigate 
damages by refusing to let Landrith repair the "hole" through the contractor Landrith 
brought to the July 23, 2004 meeting. 
(ii) Failure to use less expensive alternative means. The Association 
installed an interlocking brick retaining wall to resolve the erosion problem. The 
Association's cost of repairing the erosion damage was staggering - $32,878.93. In his 
affidavit, Bratt testified that the erosion problem could have been resolved by using an 
alternative method (rock retaining wall) for a base cost of $7,252.00, that would not have 
exceeded $11,452.00.8 
8Bratt testified that the erosion problem could have been resolved for a base cost of 
$7,252.00, that could increase by up to $4,200. R. 680-682. 
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The Utah courts have long recognized that the duty to mitigate damages includes a 
duty to take reasonable alternative actions to mitigate damages. For example, in 
Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999), the defendant was to make payments to the 
plaintiff to help repay a loan that was secured by plaintiffs property. Id. The defendant 
stopped making payments, causing the plaintiffs loan to go into default and plaintiffs 
property to be sold at a trustee's sale. Id. The trial court rejected defendant's claim that 
plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages. The appellate court reversed on the grounds 
that the plaintiff did not act reasonably to mitigate his damages. IdL at 941. Plaintiff had 
failed to act on two specific opportunities that would have mitigated his damages - selling 
his secured property to pay off the loan prior to the foreclosure sale or refinancing his 
loan. Id 
In this case, the damage to Association was the cost of fixing the erosion problem -
$32,878.02. The Association could have reduced its damages to a base cost of $7,750.00 
(and no more than $11,452.00) by using an alternative means - a rock retaining wall - to 
fix the same problem. Bratt's testimony was clearly relevant to this defense. 
In considering a motion for directed verdict the trial court is "not free to weigh the 
evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the 
facts. A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a 
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from 
the evidence presented." Management Comm. v. Gravstone Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 
39 
(Utah 1982). The Utah Court of Appeals will examine "the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co.. 
Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah App. 1996). In this case, "viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to [Landrith]," the directed verdict dismissing Landrith's mitigation of 
damages defense cannot be sustained. 
B. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
material breach by the Association. 
The Association constructed two retaining walls in the southeast corner of the 
Property - at a cost of $32,878.92 - without Landrith's knowledge or consent. At that 
time Landrith was living in Bountiful and the Property was on the market for sale. The 
construction of the two walls involved extensive work on the Property, including 
construction of a ramp along the west side of the Property and behind the Property to 
allow construction equipment to access the southeast corner of the Property. It was only 
after construction had been completed that Landrith first became aware of the 
construction. The cost of construction was funded by a special assessment of $1,450.00 
by the Association against the other homeowners in the Subdivision. 
The Association breached the Declaration by failing to approve in writing the 
plans and specifications for the two retaining walls, by failing to give Landrith notice that 
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the Association was entering his Property, by assessing the $1,450.00 special assessment 
without first obtaining the consent of 2/3 rd of the homeowner, and by failing to adopt a 
resolution authorizing constructions of the two retaining walls. 
(i) No approved plans. Under the Declaration, no "wall" "shall be 
constructed" unless the "plans and specifications" for the wall had first been approved "in 
writing" by the George Osmond Estate Architectural and Planning Control Board. 
Declaration, Section 3.3. The Association did not approved in writing the "plans and 
specifications" for the two retaining walls constructed on the Property. 
(ii) No notice prior to entry of the Property. Under the Declaration, the 
George Osmond Estates Council had to first give "reasonable notice" to Landrith before 
entering the Property to perform any maintenance. Declaration, Section 6.13. The 
Association did not give Landrith any notice that it was entering his Property to construct 
the two retaining walls. 
(iii) No vote authorizing $1,450.00 special assessment. Under the 
Declaration, the Board of Managers of the George Osmond Estates Council "may levy a 
special assessment" for the "cost of any construction or reconstruction," but only if "such 
assessment shall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the homeowners and that notice of 
such a meeting shall be sent to all members at least thirty (30) days in advance of the 
meeting." Declaration, Section 6.4. Similarly, no assessments shall be "used for capital 
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improvements9 or expenditures" unless approved by a vote of "two-thirds of the 
membership of the Council and mortgagee." Declaration, Section 6.2. The Association 
did not hold any meeting or conducted any vote to authorize the construction of the two 
retaining walls on the Property, or to authorize the levy of the $1,450.00 "special 
assessment" to fund the construction of the two retaining walls on the Property. 
(iv) No authorizing resolution. Under the Declaration, the due date for any 
"special assessment" is to be fixed "in the resolution authorizing such assessment." 
Declaration, Section 6.5. The Association did not adopt any resolution authorizing the 
construction of the two retaining walls, authorizing the $1,450.00 special assessments to 
pay for the two retaining walls or "fixing" the "due dates" for payment of the $1,450.00 
special assessment assessed by the Association to pay for the two retaining walls. 
In granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on Landrith's defense that 
the Association had materially breached the Declaration, the trial court found that the 
standard for a homeowners associations complying with a recorded declaration is not the 
same as a "normal corporation." Therefore, the Association's failure to comply with the 
foregoing provisions of the Declaration did not give rise to a defense that the Association 
had materially breached the Declarations. The trial court errored in this ruling. 
9One of the Jury Instruction submitted by Landrith provided a definition of 
"Capital Improvements" to assist the Jury in determining whether the two retaining walls 
constituted "capital improvements." After the Association's motion for directed verdict 
was granted, that Jury Instruction was not use. 
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A recorded declaration is a contract between the homeowners association and its 
members. In Swan Creek Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 
2006), the Utah Supreme Court held that the validity of an assessment against a property 
owner "turns upon the specific provisions of the declaration establishing the homeowners 
associations and conferring its assessment authority." Id. at 1131. The Court continued 
by stating that, " \ . .both Utah statutes and case law recognizes that such associations are 
controlled by their governing documents, which in fact constitute a contract between the 
association and the property owners." Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court's reasoning is 
consistent with the Community Association Act which states that the amount and timing 
of any assessment must be "in accordance with the terms of the.. .declaration." Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-8a-201(2) (Supp. 2005). 
If the Association failed to comply with a material provision of the Declaration, 
the breach would excuse the homeowner's obligation to perform. "[T]he law is well 
settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by 
the non-breaching party." Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App. 
1997.) In Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279 (Utah 1972), the Court held "[a]s a rule, a party 
first guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the other 
party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other 
party nor maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform." 
Id. at 280. 
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Sections 3.3, 6.13 and 6.65 of the Declaration were to be complied with prior to 
commencement of construction and Sections 6.2 and 6.4 prior to assessment of the 
$1,450.00 special assessment, and as such were also conditions precedent to the 
Association either commencing construction or levying the $1,450.00 special assessment. 
Failure to perform a condition precedent also excuses performance: 
Where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon 
the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, the 
obligee may not require performance by the obligor, because 
the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right to 
demand performance, does not arise until that condition 
occurs or exists. 
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc.. 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999). 
Since the Declaration constituted a contract between Landrith and the Association, 
Landrith was entitled to rely on the Association's obligation to keep the covenants 
imposed on the Association by the Declaration. The Association did not obtain a 2/3rd's 
vote of the homeowners prior to assessing the $1,450.00 special assessment to the 
homeowners to pay for the two retaining walls as required by Sections 6.2 and 6.4 of the 
Declaration. The Association did not notify Landrith that it intended to enter the Property 
for purposes of constructing the two retaining walls as required by Section 6.13 of the 
Declaration. The Association did not obtain written approval for the "plans and 
specifications for the wall from an "architectural committee" prior to commencement of 
construction as required by Section 3.3 of the Declaration. The Association did not adopt 
a resolution authority construction of the wall on the Property or imposing the $1,450.00 
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special assessment as required by Section 6.5 of the Declaration. 
In Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n. 57 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Utah 
App. 2002), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's ruling that a homeowners 
association did not follow the association's declaration when it lowered the plaintiffs 
monthly assessment without the consent of all the unit owners, and therefore the 
agreement was invalid. See also Levanger v. Vincent, 3 P.3d 187 (Utah App. 2000) 
(holding that a voting procedure adopted by a homeowner's association that was not in 
compliance with the recorded declaration was invalid and the vote taken thereunder was 
void.) 
Similarly, because the Association materially breached the Declaration, its claim 
for reimbursement against Landrith is unenforceable. In viewing the facts in a "light 
most favorable" to Landrith, there was a "reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor o f Landrith. 
Tolman at 461. Landrith was entitled to have the Jury determine whether the Association 
materially breached the Declaration, thereby excusing performance. The trial court 
errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on this issue. 
C. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the Association. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a party's actions to be 
consistent with the agreed upon common purpose and the justified expectations of the 
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other party. When one party to a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express 
contract, it must exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith. Cook v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996). St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991.) 
The Association's actions were inconsistent with the common purpose and 
justified expectations of Landrith under the Declaration. By July 2004, Landrith had 
moved to Bountiful, Utah and the Property was vacant. On May 15, 2004, Anderson and 
Landrith agreed that the Association would make no further repairs to the Property 
without Landrith's knowledge or consent. At a July 2004 meeting at the Property, 
Anderson told Landrith that it would cost at least $100,000.00 to fix the erosion but that if 
Landrith would sell the Property to him for $200,000.00 then Landrith would not have to 
worry about fixing the erosion. On July 23, 2004, Landrith brought a contractor to the 
Property to "fill the hole." At that meeting, Anderson stated that filling the "hole" with 
dirt was "no longer acceptable" and reiterated that it was going to cost at least 
$100,000.00 to fix the erosion. When Landrith rejected Anderson's $200,000 offer to 
purchase the Property, Anderson ordered construction of the two retaining walls on the 
Property, without Landrith's knowledge or consent, without complying with the 
Declarations and without complying with the May 15, 2004 agreement. 
Anderson claimed he did so because he was concerned about the "safety" of 
children in the neighborhood. However, there was no testimony at trial that any children 
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had ever been seen on or near the Property. Neither Provo City nor any other 
governmental entity had ever cited the erosion as being unsafe or otherwise violating any 
ordinance. 
Landrith had a justified expectation that Anderson would not use the Association 
to advance his own personal pecuniary interests. A fact finder could have concluded that 
Anderson did not order construction of the two retaining walls because he was concerned 
about the "safety" of children in the neighborhood, but in retaliation for Landrith's 
rejection of his offer to purchase the Property for $200,000.00. A fact finder could have 
also concluded that the Anderson's decision to fix the hole for $32,878.92 was not 
exercised "reasonably" or "in good faith." The erosion could have been fixed at a much 
lower cost. However, Anderson wanted to impose the greatest cost possible on Landrith. 
D. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
waiver by the Association. 
A waiver of a right has occurred where a right exists, a person has knowledge of 
that right and the totality of circumstances warrants the interference of a relinquishment 
of that right by that person. IHC Health Service, Inc. v. D&K Management, Inc., 73 P.3d 
320 (Utah 2003.) 
In 1977, the Declaration was recorded, granting the George Osmond Estates 
Council certain powers with respect to property located within the Subdivision. When the 
Association organized in 1979, it did not organize as the "George Osmond Estates 
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Council"- the entity identified in Declaration. The Association did not incorporate as a 
non-profit corporation, did not adopt any organizing document granting voting rights, did 
not give copies of its Articles of Incorporation (or other organizing documents) to new 
purchasers, did not assess one-half of the annual assessments on January 1 and one-half 
on July 1 of each year, all as the George Osmond Estates Council was required to do 
under the Declaration. The Association collected unpaid assessments through recording 
"mechanics liens"- not pursuant to the Declaration. 
If the Association wanted to be the George Osmond Estates Council, it would have 
organized as the George Osmond Estates Council and it would have operated as the 
George Osmond Estates Council was described as operating under the Declaration. A 
fact finder could have found that the Association's intentional decision to organize and 
operate as something different than the George Osmond Estates Council evidenced an 
"intentional relinquishment of [the] right" to claim the authority to act as the George 
Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. 
IV. INTEREST WAS NOT CALCULATED CORRECTLY IN THE JUDGMENT 
The Declaration provides that in the event the Association incurs a maintenance 
cost with respect to a property, the assessment of the maintenance costs shall become 
"part of the annual assessment" and shall be "due and payable as provided in Article VI." 
Declaration, Section 6.12. Article VI of the Declaration provides that annual assessment 
charges are to be "payable in semi-annual installments," with one-half of the amount is 
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due on January 1st and one-half on July 1st of each year. Declaration, Section 6.6. If the 
payment is not made within 30 days of the due date (i.e., Vi by the following January 31st 
and July 31st, respectively) then interest begins to accrued at 10% per annum. Declaration, 
Section 6.8. 
In this case, had the $32,878.92 set forth in the Notice of Lien been charged in 
accordance with the Declaration, one-half ($16,439.36) would have been due on January 
1, 2006 and one-half ($16,439.36) would have been due on July 1, 2006. Pursuant to 
Section 6.8 of the Declaration, $16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum 
from January 31, 2006 through January 12, 2009 (the date the Judgment was entered), and 
$16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum from July 31, 2006 through 
January 12, 2009 - for a total of approximately $8,877.25 in interest. Interest on the two 
subsequent invoices from Rainmaker of Utah (the May 15, 2006 invoice of $74.20 and 
the July 15, 2008 invoice of $161.00), calculated pursuant to Section 6.8 the Declaration 
would constitute an additional $25.49 of interest, for a total of $8,902.74. 
In requesting an award of interest the Association ignored that provisions of the 
Declaration, instead requesting interest "from the date the debt was incurred" pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1(2) at a rate of 10% per annum, for a total of 
$10,627.75 in interest. The form of Judgment submitted by the Association (and signed 
by the Court) awarded interest pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1(2). 
Therein, the Court did not apply the Declaration, but instead applied only Section 15-1-
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1(2). 
By its terms Utah Code Annotated Section 15-l-l-(2) does not apply where there 
is a "lawful contract" between the parties that "specifies a different rate of interest." See 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2). While the rate of interest is the same in the 
Declaration as in Section 15-1-1(2) - 10% per annum - the date from which the interest 
begins to accrue is later under the Declaration than under Section 15-1-1(2). 
If interest on the $33,143.62 was calculated in accordance with Section 6.8 of the 
Declaration, the amount of interest would be $8,877.25, or $1,750.50 less than if 
calculated pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1(2). Landrith objected to the 
Association's calculation of interest, arguing that interest should be calculated pursuant to 
the Declaration. The trial court errored in calculating pre-judgment interest pursuant to 
Section 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to the terms of the Declaration. A trial court's 
ruling as to the legal basis for awarding interest rates is a question of law and is reviewed 
for correctness. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry. 
886 P.2d 514, 526 (Utah 1994.) The trial court errored in calculating interest pursuant to 
Section 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to the Declaration. 
V. THE ASSOCIATION WAS AWARDED "COSTS" THAT WERE NOT 
RECOVERABLE. 
The Association claimed $1,813.02 in costs. Landrith objected to the following 
$403.82 in costs: 
Description Amount 
50 
Postage to mail initial disclosures $4.30 
Certified copies of Request for Hearing and Minutes of Hearing $9.50 
Copies $18.96 
Copies $31.45 
Copies of George Landrith Deposition $73.93 
Copies for deposition $5.68 
Expert witness - Conrad Guymon from CKR Engineers, Inc. $250.00 
Copies of Declaration on Protective Covenants from the Utah 
County Recorder's Office $10.00 
Total $403.82 
In response to Landrith5s objection, the Association stated that "it would accept a 
reduction of costs...in the amount of $329.89," leaving a balance of $1,485.13. R. 1514. 
The Association nevertheless submitted a form of Judgment which included the full 
amount of costs claimed - $1,815.02 - which the Court granted. The only charge objected 
to by Landrith that the Association didn't agree to withdraw was $73.93 for "copies of 
George Landrith's Deposition." That is not the cost for George Landrith's deposition, 
which was claimed by the Association in the amount of $929.60. This was a separate cost 
for making a copy of George Landrith's deposition, which the Association already had. 
That "copy cost" was not recoverable as a cost. See Beaver v. Qwest Inc.. 2001 UT 81, 
31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001). The expert witness fee objected to by Landrith is also not 
recoverable as costs. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (UT 1980.) The trial court 
errored in awarding the $403.82 in costs that were objected to by Landrith. 
The standard of review for award of costs is abuse of discretion. Qwest at f 25. In 
this case, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding costs that the Association 
admitted should not be awarded as costs, and by awarding photocopy costs. Id. (holding 
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the award of photocopy costs "exceeded the permitted range of discretion" in awarding 
costs.) 
VI. THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMED WAS NOT 
REASONABLE FOR THE SERVICES RENDERED. 
The Declaration provides that in the event a judgment is obtained, such judgment 
shall include "reasonable attorney's fees." Declaration, Section 6.8. The Association 
claimed $59,831.90 in attorney's fees, and included an itemized list of all attorney time 
claimed. Landrith filed an objection to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed 
by the Association on the grounds that they were excessive and included a significant 
duplication of services. Without explanation, the Court overruled Landrith's objection 
and awarded the Association all attorney's fees requested ($59,831.90.) 
A trial court's award of attorney's fees is usually review under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988); 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). However, "The trial court must 
make findings of fact supporting the reasonableness of its fee award." Matter of Estate of 
Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "These findings must be sufficiently 
detailed, and include enough subsidiary facts, to disclose the steps by which the trial 
court's decision was reached." Id. at 286. When the trial court does not make findings of 
fact supporting the reasonableness of its award of attorney's fees, the matter is reversed 
and remanded by the appellate court. See American Vending Services, Inc., v. Morse, 881 
P.2d 917, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reversing and remanding where the court failed to 
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support its decision through evidence in the record.) 
In this case, Landrith objected to the reasonableness of the Association's claim for 
attorney's fees. For example, at trial, Thomas Seiler candidly admitted to the Jury in 
opening statements that this was his co-counsel, Aaron Lancaster's, first trial, that he was 
"very new" at the practice of law and that he's "here to learn right along with you." R. 
1547, pg. 12. Aaron Lancaster attended the full trial, but did not conduct any examination 
or cross-examination or otherwise participate in the trial in any way. The Association 
requested that Landrith pay for all of Aaron Lancaster's time at the trial (10.10 hours on 
December 4, 2008 and 10.80 hours on December 5, 2008) for a total of $3,135.00. 
Landrith objected to being charged for "training time" for a new attorney. 
In Bruno v. Western Electric Co., 618 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Colo. 1985), aff d in 
part and rev'd in part on other grounds 829 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1987), defendants 
objected to a claim for attorney's fees by one of the plaintiffs attorneys, who had just 
recently graduated from law school was only involved for the purpose of being trained. 
Id. at 404. The court agreed with the defendant and held that there is no justification for 
charging this attorney's time to an opponent who has lost the case when it is to give 
young people more courtroom experience. Id. 
The amount of attorney's fees claimed by the Association should have been 
reduced significantly to reflect the reasonable amount of time required to prosecute this 
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action - exclusive of duplication of services or training time.10 The trial court errored by 
failing to make any findings of fact as to the reasonableness of the fees claimed by the 
Association and the award should be reversed. 
VII. IF LANDRITH PREVAILS ON THIS APPEAL. LANDRITH SHOULD BE 
AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
If Landrith prevails on this appeal, Landrith should be awarded his attorney's fees. 
The trial court award the Association its attorney's fees pursuant to Section 6.8 of the 
Declaration. Where a contract allows for the award of attorney's fees to one party as the 
prevailing party, the other party is also entitled to attorney's fees if he prevails. See Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78B-5-826. This is so even if the Association is determined to 
have no authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. 
See Bilanzich v. LonettL 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2007) (awarding attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party under this statute even where the contract containing fees 
10Similarly, the Association was represented by two attorney's at every hearing, 
pre-trial conference, final pre-trial conference and meetings with Mr. Cline. (See time 
entries for December 28, 2006, January 2, 2007, December 2, 2008, December 3, 2008, 
December 4, 2008 and December 5, 2008.) For example, the entire trial was attended by 
both Mr. Lancaster and Mr. Seiler (see time entries for December 4 and 5, 2008). The 
Association claimed 4.50 hours ($742.50) drafting an Order granting the Association's 
Motion for Summary Judgment which included rulings that the court did not make. R. 
1491. Because it included rulings the Court did not make, the court rejected that form of 
Order and signed defendants form of order instead. Minute Entry, R. 485. ("Ordinarily, I 
allow the prevailing party to prepare the proposed order. In this matter, however, the 
Order prepared by the prevailing party [the Association] is overbroad and includes ruling 
that I did not make...I have this day signed the form of order prepared by defendant's 
counsel.") The form of Order submitted by defendants counsel was five lines long, and 
wouldn't have taken more than 2/10s of hours to dictate, proof and mail. 
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clause was invalidated.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling denying Landrith's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be reversed, and this matter dismissed. Landrith should be 
awarded his costs and attorney's fees in appeal, and this case should be remanded for the 
trial court to award Landrith attorney's fees below. Alternatively, the trial court's order 
granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment, order precluding Bratt from 
testifying at trial and order granting the Association's motion for directed verdict should 
be reversed as to all four defenses and this matter remanded for re-trial. The trial court's 
award of costs, attorney's fees and pre-judgment interest should also be reversed. 
Dated this [0 day of December, 2009. 
Russdf Cline, Attorney for Defendant 
55 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J0_ day of December, 2009,1 caused to be 
delivered two copies first class mail, postage pre-paid, the foregoing to: 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Lori D. Huntington 
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C. 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
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Addendum A - Declaration of Protective Covenants 
12087 
DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS 
This Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restrictions is 
made this 19th day of Ap r i l , 1977, by FLYING DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, hereinafter called "Declarant." 
W I T N E S S E S : 
WHEREAS, Declarant 1s the owner of the real property described 
in Article II hereof (herein called the "Property") and desires to 
create George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision consisting of a residential 
area for single family dwellings, streets, sidewalks, medians and other 
related facilities for the benefit of a common buildthg scheme (herein 
collectively designated as Georqe Osmond Estates); and 
WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed 1t necessary and desirable, for 
the welfare of the inhabitants of George Osmond Estates and the preservation 
of its values, to subject said real property to the covenants, restrictions, 
easements, charges, assessments and liens hereinafter set forth, which 
covenants, restrictions, easements, charges, assessments and liens shall 
be burdens and benefits to Declarant, its respective successors and 
assigns and grantees, and their successors, heirs, executors, adminis-
trators, devisees, grantees or assigns; and 
WHEREAS, Declarant hereby desires to create certain aqencies 
to which should be delegated and assigned the powers and duties of 
maintaining and administering the common properties and areas, and 
administering and enforcing the covenants and restrictions and collecting 
and disbursing the assessments and charges hereafter created; 
NOW THEREFORE, the Declarant declares that the real property 
described in Article II hereof is and shall be held, transferred, sold, 
occupied, and conveyed subject to the covenants, restrictions, easements, 
charges and liens (sometimes referred to as "covenants and restrictions") 
hereinafter set forth, sa'id covenants and restrictions being covenants 
real which shall run with the land and be considered to be included in 
all conveyances, transfers, and leases of any part of said land described 
in Article II hereof, whether or not specifically mentioned therein. 
ARTICLE I, 
Section 1.1 Definitions. The following words when used in 
this declaration or m any Supplemental declaration (unless inconsistent 
with the context hereof) shall have the followinq meaning: 
A. "Board" means the George Osmond Estates Architectural 
and Planning Control Board as hereinafter established. 
B. "Builder" means any person at whose direction construction 
or reconstruction of a residential house is accomplished, 
whether by direct labor and material or through a contractor 
or subcontractor. 
C. "Council11 means the George Osmond Estates Council, a 
Utah non-stock, non-profit membership corporation to be organized 
to provide certain facilities and services to the community 
and its inhabitants and visitors. 
D. "Common Area" means those portions of the Property 
specified on the Plat, including the private road. 
E. "Final Development Plan" means the Final Development 
Plan for George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision, as approved by 
the City Council of Provo, Utah, on the 22nd day of February , 
1977, and any supplement or amendment thereto. 
F. "Parcel" means any lesser included legal description 
pf real property which falls within the boundaries of the real 
property described 1n Article II hereof including, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, any building or 
otructural component thereof situate upon the Property, but 
jhall not include the Common Area. 
G. "Plat" means George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision 
]ocated in Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Utah 
County, City of Provo, Utah, as filed for record in the 
offices of the Court Recorder of Utah County, Utah, on the 
> X _ ^ ** Tiarrti ^"»-
H- "Owner" means the record owner, whether one or more 
persons or entities, of the fee simple title to any Parcel, 
fcut shall not mem or refer to any person or entity who holds 
5uch interest merely as security for the performance of a 'debt 
0r other obligation, including a mortgagee or beneficiary 
under a deed of trust, unless and until such person has 
acquired fee simple title pursuant to foreclosure or other 
proceedings. 
I. "Utility Lines" means all water and sewer pipelines 
and gas mains which H e beneath the surface of the ground, all 
fire hydrants, and also all electric, telephone, and other 
wire lines, with poles and other necessary appurtenances which 
rUn above or below the surface of the ground. 
J. "Board of Managers" means the governing body of the 
Council, elected by the members of the Council, to perform the 
0pligations of the Council relative to operation, maintenance 
apd management of George Osmond Estates. 
ARTICLE II 
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THIS DECLARATION 
AND ADDITIONS THERETO 
Section 2,1 Existing Property. The real property which i s , 
and shall b0> held, transferred, sold, conveyed, and occupied, subject 
to thTs~Decl aration i s H Seated" in ~the~City" of "Provo ,~CoWty~lrFlJtah, and 
State of Ut#n» more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto 
and by this reference made a part hereof, SUBJECT TO the rights-of-way 
for ingress a n d e ^ e s s for service and emergency vehicles granted over, 
across,
 o n n^d through any and all private roads and ways now or hereafter 
established o n *he Property as more fully set forth in the Plat and all 
streets and easements appearing thereon. 
ARTICLE III 
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL 
Section 3.1 Board. The George Osmond Estates Architectural 
and Planning Control Board shall consist of three members who shall be 
designated W tne Board °^ Managers of the Council- The Board shall 
review study-> arK* approve
 or reject proposed improvements upon the 
Property suW e c t t0 these covenants and restrictions. 
Section 3.2. Rules. The Board may make such rules and by-
laws as it lf®y deefn appropriate to govern its proceedings. 
Section 3.3 Approval of Plan. No building, outbuilding, 
fence wall* or other improvements that are not already located on such 
property s h ^ De constructed, erected or maintained, nor shall any 
additions ther*to, or alteration therein, be made until plans and 
specifications showing the design, color, location, materials, landscaping 
and such other information relating to such improvement as the Board may 
reasonably require shall have been submitted to and approved by the 
Board in wH t i n9-
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Section 3.4 Schedule of Submissions and Approvals. Each 
builder or owner will submit the required plans and specifications to 
the Board at least fifteen (15) days before the desired date of approval. 
If the design is disapproved, the builder or owner will re-submit plans 
and specifications with the required changes. The Board will reserve 
the right to require reasonable extension of time and additional information 
in order to make decisions on approvals. 
Section 3.S Criteria. In passing upon such plans and specific-
ations, the Board shall consider: 
A. professional Services and Documents. 
1. Architectural and Engineering Services. 
Each Builder or Owner will hire competent architectural 
and engineering advisors who will coordinate the des IOTI 
and construction documents for the construction of each 
structure, addition, change or alteration with the 
architect and engineer who are employed as advisors to 
the Board. The design and construction documents shall 
provide a construction schedule with an estimated date of 
completion for each phase of construction. 
*^ Documents. Each Builder or Owner will submit 
for approval the following documents: 
a. Design documents, which show general 
dtspostion of structures, finish materials and 
equipment on floor plans and elevations with per-
spectives as required for explanation. Each set of 
design documents will designate the number and area 
of each living unit type to be constructed, together 
with the Identification of the use to be made of 
eaxh room or space included in each living unit 
type. 
b. Construction documents which show informa-
tion in drawings and specifications as required for 
building permit, efficient communication for construction, 
and review of systems and materials quality by the 
Declarant. 
*** jgnerally. It shall be an objective of the Board to 
make certain that no improvements will impair the monetary and 
aesthetic values of George Osmond Estates.--The_ Board shall, 
consider the suitability of the improvements and the materials 
of which they are to be constructed with respect to the particular 
area in which they are to be located; the quality of materials 
to be utilized in any proposed improvement and the effect of 
any proposed improvement on adjacent or neighboring property 
and the location and character and method of utilization of 
all utility lines. 
Section 3.6 Effect of Board's Failure to Act. In the event 
the Board fails to approve or disapprove plans and specification documents 
submitted to it within thirty (30) days of submission, no extension of 
time has been required, and no suit to enjoin the construction has been 
commenced prior to the completion thereof, approval shall not be required 
and the related covenants shall be determined to have been fully complied 
witb^  The Board ska)] not be liable to any person for its actions in 
connection with submitted documents, unless it can be shown that they 
acted with malice or wrongful intent. 
ARTICLE IV 
JlEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS 
IN THE MUNCH" 
Section 4.1 Membership. Members of the Council shall be 
every Owner of a fee or undivided fee interest in any Parcel subject by 
covenants of record to assessment by the Council and every person who 
holds a contract purchaser's interest of record in a Parcel. There 
shall be no other qualification for membership except as set forth 
above. Membership shall terminate on transfer of a fee simple title by 
an Owner or the contract purchaser's interest by a contract purchaser 
who qualifies as a member. If an Owner sells a Parcel by contract of 
sale, upon recordation thereof, the Owner's membership shall terminate 
and the contract purchaser's membership shall commence. 
Section 4.2 Compliance with Council Articles, By-Laws, etc. 
Each Owner shall abide by and benefit from each provision, covenant, 
condition and restriction contained in the Articles of Incorporation and 
By-Laws of the Council, a copy of which 1s provided to each Owner at the 
time of purchase, and by which each Owner agrees to be bound„ or which 
is contained 1n any rule, regulation, or restriction promulgated pursuant 
to said Articles and By-Laws. The obligations, burdens, and benefits of 
membership in the Council, to the extent that they touch and concern the 
land, shall be covenants running with each Owner's Parcel for the 
benefit of all other Parcels and the Common Area. 
Section 4.3 Voting Rights. The voting rights of the members 
shall be as specified in the Articles of Incorporation. 
ARTICLE V 
RIGHTS IN THE COMMON AREA 
Section 5.1 Members' Licenses of Enjoyment. Every member of 
the Council shall have an irrevocable license to enjoy the Common Area. 
Access to the private road may be controlled by a lockable gate, provided 
that said gate must meet all requirements of the City of Provo and other 
governmental agencies. 
Section 5.2 Title to Common Area. The Declarant, its successors 
and assigns shall retain the legal title to the Common Area until such 
time as it has completed improvements thereon and until such time as, in 
the opinion of the Declarant, the Council is able to maintain the same, 
but notwithstanding any provisions herein, the Declarant hereby covenants, 
for itself, its heirs and assigns, that it shall convey the Common Area 
to the Council not later than October 1, 1978, 
Section 5.3 Right to Transfer. The right of the Council to 
dedicate or transfer all or any part of the Common Area to any public 
agency, authority, or utility for such purposes and subject to such 
conditions as may be agreed to by the members, provided that no such 
dedication or transfer, determination as to the purposes or as to the 
conditions thereof, shall be effective unless an instrument signed by 
members entitled to cast two-thirds (2/3) of the votes has been recorded, 
agreeing to such dedication, transfer, purpose or condition, and unless 
written notice of the proposed agreement and action thereunder is sent" 
to every member at least thirty (30) days in advance of any action 
taken. 
ARTICLE VI 
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Section 6.1 Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation of 
Assessments. Each Owner of any Parcel by acceptance of a deed therefor, 
whether or not it shall be so expressed in any such deed or other conveyance, 
agrees to pay to the Council: (1) annual assessments or charges as 
provided herein; and (2) special assessments for capital improvements, 
such assessments to be fixed, established, and collected from time to 
time as hereinafter provided. The annual and special assessments, 
together with such interest thereon and costs of collection thereof diS 
hereinafter provided, shall be a charge on the land and shall be a 
continuing lien upon the property against which each such assessment is 
made until paid. Each „uch assessment, together with such interest 
thereon and cost of collection thereof as hereinafter provided, shall 
also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such 
Parcel at the time when the assessment fell due. 
Section 6.2 Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied 
by the Council shall be used for the purpose of promoting the health, 
safety, and welfare of the residents of George Osmond Estates and in 
particular for the improvement and maintenance of the Property, the 
services, and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area, 
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and insurance thereon 
and general maintenance, repair, replacement, and additions thereto, the 
cost of labor, equipment, materials, management, and supervision thereof. 
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital Improvements 
or expenditures unless approved by a vote of two-thirds of the membership 
of the Council and mortgagees. 
Section 6.3 Assessments. Annual assessments shall begin 1n 
the year beginning January 1, 1978. Unless changed by vote of the 
membership, the maximum annual assessment for any Parcel shall be $200.00 
per year. The Board of Managers of the Council may, after consideration 
of the current maintenance costs and the financial requirements of the 
Council, fix the actual assessment at an amount less than the maximum. 
The maximum annual assessment may be charged as follows: 
A. From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual 
assessment may be Increased each year not more than 10% above 
the maximum assesment for the previous year without a vote of 
the membership. 
fi. From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual 
assessment may be increased above 10% by a vote of one-half 
(1/2) of the members who are voting in person or by proxy, at 
a meeting duly called for this purpose. 
C. The Board of Managers may fix the annual assessment 
at an amount nrt in excess of the maximum. 
Written notice of any meeting of members called to change the 
maximum annual assessment shall be sent to all members at least thirty 
(30) days in advance of the date of such meeting, setting forth the 
purposes of the meeting. 
Section 6.4 Special Assessments for Capital Improvements. 
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by Section 6.3 hereof, 
the Board of Managers of the Council may levy a special assessment for 
the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any construction 
or reconstruction, unexpected repair or replacement of any capital 
improvements upon the Common Area, including the necessary fixtures and 
personal property related thereto, provided that any such assessment 
shall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of the Council 
who are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting duly called for this 
purpose, written notice of which shalj be sent to all members at least 
thirty (30) days in advance and shall set forth the purpose of the 
meeting. 
Section 6.5 Quorum. A quorum for any action authorized under 
5ections 6.3 and 6.4 hereof shall be as follows: 
At the first meeting called, as provided in Sections 6.3 and 
6.4 hereof, the presence at the meeting of members, or of 
proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60%) of all votes of 
the Council shall constitute a quorum. If the required quorum 
is not forthcoming at any meeting, another meeting may be 
called, subject to the notice requirements set forth in Sections 
6.3 and 6.4 and the required quorum at any such subsequent 
meeting shall be one-half of the required quorum at the 
preceding meeting, provided that no such subsequent meeting 
shall be held more than sixty (60) days following the preceding 
meeting. 
Section 6.6 Payment of Annual Assessments: Due Dates. The 
annual assessments provided for herein shall be payable in semi-annual 
installments (1/2 of the annual assessment) on the first day of each 
January and July of each year. The due date of any special assessments 
under Section 6.4 hereof shall be fixed in the resolution authorizing 
such assessment. 
Section 6.1 Duties of the Council. The Council shall, at 
least ten (10) days in advance of the assessment date or period, prepare 
a roster of the properties and assessments applicable thereto which 
shall be kept in the office of the Council and shall be open to inspection 
by any Owner, and shall at that time, fix the amount of the assessment 
in accordance with this Declaration against each Parcel for each assessment 
period. 
Written notice of the assessment shall thereupon be sent 
to e^ery Owner and mortgagee or prospective mortgagee subject thereto. 
A list of mortgagees to whom notices are to be sent, 
shall be maintained by the Council and changes therein shall be the 
responsiblity of the Owners. 
The Council shall, upon demand at any time furnish to any 
Owner and mortgagee, or prospective Owner or mortgagee liable for said 
assessment, a certificate in writing signed by an officer of the Council, 
setting forth whether said assessment has been paid. Such certificate 
shall be conclusive evidence of payment of any assessment therein stated 
to have been paid. 
Section 6.8 Effect of Non-Payment of Assessment: The Personal 
Obligation of the QwnerT The Lien; Remedies of Declarant." If the assessments 
are not paid on the date when due (being the dates specified in Section 
6.6 hereof), then such assessment shall become delinquent and shall, 
together with such interest thereon and cost of collection thereof as 
hereinafter provided, thereupon become a continuing lien on the property 
which shall bind such property in the hands of the then Owner, his 
heirs, devisees, personal respresentatives and assign*. The personal 
obligation of the then Owner to pay such assessment shall in addition 
remain his personal obligation until such assessment is paid or the 
statutory period runs, whichever is shorter. 
If the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days 
after the delinquency date, the assessment shall bear interest from the 
date of delinquency at the rate of ten percent (102) per annum, and the 
Council may bring an action against the party personally obligated to 
pay the same and/or foreclose the lien against the property, and there 
shall be added to the amount of such assessment the costs of preparing 
and filing the complaint in such action, and in the event a judgment is 
obtained, such judgment shall include interest on the assessment as 
above provided and reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court 
together with all other costs of the action. 
Section 6.9 Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages. The lien 
of the assessments provided herein shall be subordinate to the lien of 
any first mortgage or deed of trust now or hereafter placed upon the 
Property or any Parcel or portion thereof subject to assessment. Sale 
or transfer of such property pursuant to a decree of foreclosure or by a 
public trustee's foreclosure, or any other proceeding or deed in lieu of 
foreclosure, shall relieve such property from assessments previously 
levied, but shall not relieve such property from liability for any 
assessments assessed after such acquisition of title, nor from the lien 
of any such subsequent assessment. 
Section 6.10 Exempt Property. The following property subject 
to this Declaration shall be exempted from the assessments, charge and 
lien created herein. 
A. All properties to the extent of any easement or 
other interest therein dedicated and accepted by the local 
public authority and devoted to public use; 
B. The Common Area; 
c. All properties exempted from taxation by the laws of 
the State of Utah, upon the terms and to the extent of such 
legal exemption. 
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Section 6.11 Exterior Haintenance. In addition to maintenance 
upon the Common Area, the Council may provide exterior maintenance upon 
each Parcel which is subject to assessment under this Article VI hereof, 
as follows: paint, repair, replace and care for roofs, gutters, downspouts, 
exterior building surfaces, trees, shrubs, grass walks, and other exterior 
improvements. 
Section 6.12 Assessment of Cost. The cost of such exterior 
maintenance shall be assessed against the Parcel upon which such maintenance 
is done and shall be added to and become a part of the annual assessment 
or charge or charges to which such Parcel is subject under this Article 
VI hereof and, as part of such assessment or charge, it shall be a lien 
against the Parcel and obligation of the Owner or Owners thereof and 
shall become due and payable in all respects as provided in this Article VI 
hereof. 
Section 6.13 Access at Reasonable Hours. For the purpose 
solely of performing the maintenance required by this krticle^ the 
Council, through its duly authorized agents or employees shall have the 
right, after reasonable notice to the Owner, to enter upon any Parcel at 
reasonable hours, provided that in the case of emergencies the Council, 




Section 7.1 Improvements Prohibited. No used or secondhand 
structure, no building of a temporary character, no mobile home, house 
trailer, tent, shack or outbuilding shall be placed or used on the 
Property, either temporarily or permanently; except that necessary 
appurtenances for and during actual construction may be used and trailers 
and structures of a temporary nature may be used during the period of 
permanent construction of an approved and allowed improvement, but no 
longer period than 12 months without the written consent of the Board. 
Section 7,2 Siqns. No signs, billboards, posterbo^rds or 
advertising structure of any kind shall be erected or maintained for any 
purpose_whatsoever_except such signs as have been approved by the Board 
as reasonably necessary foF identification "of residences~and places~of" 
business. Any signs which are permitted under the foregoing restrictions 
shall be erected or maintained on the Properties only with the prior 
written approval of the Board which approval shall be given only if such 
signs shall be of attractive design and shall be as small a size as 
reasonably possible and shall be placed or located as directed or 
approved by the Board. 
Section 7.3 Water and Sewage. Each structure designed for 
occupancy or use by human beings shall connect with the water and sewage 
facilities of the City of Provo or such water and/or sewer systems as 
the Board may approve. No private well shall be used as a source of 
water for human consumption or irrigation, nor shall any facility other 
than those provided as set out above be used for disposal of sewage. 
Section 7,4 Trash and Sewage. No trash, ashes or other 
refuse or debris may be thrown or dumped on the Property. The burning 
of refuse out-of-doors shall not be permitted. No Incinerators or other 
device for the burning of refuse indoors shall be constructed, installed 
or used by any person except as approved by the Board. Waste materials, 
garbage and trash shall be kept 1n sanitary containers and shall be 
enclosed and screened from public view and protected from disturbance 
and shall be disposed of with reasonable promptness. 
Section 7.5 Livestock. Dogs, cats or other customary household 
pets may be kept on the Property, not to exceed two per Parcel without 
the written approval of the Board of Managers. However, no pet may be 
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kept which abnormally Interferes with the rights, comforts or convenience 
of other Owners. Breeding of any animals on the Property is specifically 
prohibited. All pets must be kept on a leash when outside its Owner's 
Parcel. 
Section 7.6 Setback Requirements. The location of each 
improvement with relation to property lines must be within the buildable 
area established for 1t on the Final Development Plan and the Plat. The 
location of each improvement within the buildable area must also be 
approved in advance by the Board. In determining the proper location 
for each improvement, the Board shall consider the location of existing 
and future Improvements on adjacent property, and such other monetary or 
aesthetic consideration as it may deem necessary. 
Section 7.7 Landscaping and Gardening. All surface areas 
disturbed by construction shall be returned promptly to their natural 
condition. 
Section 7.8 Trade Names. No word, name, symbol or combination 
thereof shall be used to identify for commercial purposes a structure, 
business or service, unless the same shall have been first approved in 
writing by the Board. 
Section 7.9 Continuity of Construction. All structures 
commenced shall be prosecuted diligently to completion. 
Section 7.10 Noxious or Offensive Activity. No noxious or 
offensive activity shall be carried on upon any Parcel nor shall anything 
be done or placed on the Property which is or may become a nuisance or 
cause embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to others. 
Section 7.11 Maintenance of Property. Every Parcel, including 
improvements, shall be kept and maintained by the Owner thereof in a 
clean, safe, attractive and sightly condition, and in good repair; no 
inoperative private automobile shall be placed or remain on any Parcel 
or adjacent street for more than 48 hours; no commercial type vehicles 
and no trucks shall be stored or parked on any Parcel or residential 
street except while engaged in transportation; trailers, mobile homes, 
trucks, boats, tractors, campers not on a truck, vans of any kind, 
buses, snow removal equipment and garden o»" maintenance equipment shall 
be kept at all times, except when in actual use, in a closed structure 
or screened from view; service areas, storage piles, facilities for 
hanging, drying or airing clothing Tor household fabrics shall~be~appropriately 
screened from view, and no lumber, grass, shrub or tree clippings or 
plant waste, metals, bulk materials, scrap, refuse or trash shall be 
kept, stored or allowed to accumulate on any Parcel. 
Section 7.12 Annoying Lights, Sounds or Odors. Mo lights 
shall be emitted from any property which are unreasonably bright or 
cause unreasonable glare; no sound shall be emitted from any Parcel 
which is unreasonably loud or annoying; and no odor shall be emitted 
from any Parcel which is noxious or offensive to others. 
Section 7.13 Fences. No fences, walls or other barriers 
shall be permitted except with the written consent of the Board. 
Section 7.14 Subdivision. No Owner shall further subdivide 
any Parcel of the Property after the same has been platted, and the plat 
approved as required by the City of Provo, Utah, without the consent of 
the Board in writing and proper presentation to and acquiescence by the 
City of Provo. 
ARTICLE VIII 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 8.1 Duration. The covenants and restrictions of this 
Declaration shall run with and bind the land and shall inure to the 
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benefit of and be binding upon the Owner of any Parcel and subject to 
this Declaration, their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, 
and assigns, for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date this 
Declaration is recorded, after which time said covenants shall be automatica 
extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an Instrument 
signed by the then Owners of two-thirds (2/3) of the Parcels and all of 
the mortgagees thereof has been recorded, agreeing to change said covenants 
and restrictions in whole or in part. Provided, however, that no such 
agreement to change shall be effective unless written notice of the 
proposed agreement is sent to every Owner at least thirty (30) days in 
advance of any action taken. 
Section 8.2 Notices. Any notice required to be sent to any 
member. Owner or mortaaaee under the provisions of this Declaration 
shall be deemed to have been properly sent when mailed, postpaid, to the 
last known address of the person who appears a member, Owner or mortgagee 
on the records of the Council at the time of such mailing. 
Section 8.3 Easements. Declarant hereby reserves to Itself 
its successors and assigns, perpetual easements under, over, and across 
the Common Area and under, over, and across each Parcel specified on the 
Plat for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating sewers 
and drainage systems^ conduits for lightig, heating, power, telephone, 
and other methods of conducting and performing any public or quasi-
public utility service or function. Within such easements, the following 
restrictions shall apply: 
A. No building, structure, tree, or other object shall 
be built upon or be permitted to encroach upon the utility 
line itself or within five (5) feet of either side of the 
centerline of such a line without the written permission of 
the Board, and Declarant reserves the right to remove all such 
buildings, structures, or objects from any such area, when 
installed without permission of the Board. Where the board 
grants such permissions, and it subsequently becomes necessary 
to disturb, injure or remove the same in the utilization of 
the easement for the purpose for which it is reserved, removal 
shall be accomplished at the expense of the Owner, and neither 
the Declarant, the Council, nor the Board, nor any utility 
company utilizing the easement with the consent of the Board 
shall be responsible to the Owner for injury or damages to 
such structures, trees, or other planting or object. 
B. Access to the easements shall always be available to 
the Declarant, the Council or to public utilities with the 
consent of the Board seeking to install, maintain, and repair 
utility lines and facilities of all sorts, whether or not it 
is necessary for the purposes of such access, installation, 
maintenance, and repair to enter upon any other property not 
designated as utility line areas, the use of such easements to 
be generally for the good of all Parcel Owners in the maintenance 
of lines, facilities, and services. 
Section 8.4 Enforcement of Covenants and Restrictions. If 
any person, firm or corporation shall violate or threaten to violate any 
of the provisions of this instrument, it shall be lawful for the Declarant, 
the Council or the Board or for any person, firm or corporation owning 
land included xithin this Declaration, to Institute proceedings at law 
or in equity to enforce the provisions of this instrument, to restrain 
the person, firm or corporation violating or threatening to violate them 
and to recover damages, actual and punitive, together with reasonable 
attorneys' fees, for such violations or threatened violations- No 
failure on the part of any such person, firm or corporation or Declarant 
to enforce any covenant immediately after any such cause may arise shall 
be deemed a waiver as to that cause or of any similar cause that may 
thereafter arise. 
Section 8.5 Declarant's Rights Assignable. All of the rights 
of the Declarant herein reserved, including rights reserved to enforce 
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any and all of the covenants and reservations shall be freely assignable 
and any assignee shall succeed to all of the rights of any assignee 
thereof. 
Section 8.6 Disclaimer of Creation of Private Property Rights 
by Certain Unrecorded Public Documents. The Declarant has submitted to 
2oning and planning authorities of the City of Provo, Utah, the Final 
Development Plan for the future development of George Osmond Estates, in 
order to fulfill the requirements of the City ordinances relating to 
zoning and subdivisions control. Said Plan is on file with the City 
Clerk- The Declarant may be required to make additional submissions of 
plans to the City authorities. All such plans are part of the public 
controls imposed by the City upon the Declarant, Owners, residents and 
users of George Osmond Estates, and they do not create, and are not 
intended to create any private property or contract rights in the Owners 
and residents of George Osmond Estates. The plans which the Declarant 
has submitted to the City represents a plan of development which the 
Declarant believes will provide maximum benefits to the residents, 
Owners and the public. During the development program, however, various 
factors can intervene which may hinder the effectiveness of such long-
range plans and which may threaten the benefits to be derived by the 
residents. Owners and the public unless such plans can be modified as 
prescribed by the applicable City ordinances. Accordingly, this Declaration 
is not intended to nor does grant or create any private property or 
contract rights under any of the above described plans and such plans 
continue to remain subject to modification by the proper City authorities 
in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ordinances of the 
City. 
Section 8.7 Amendment. This Declaration may be amended by an 
instrument signed by ct least eighty percent (805.) of the Parcel owners 
of record and the holders of mortgages or deeds of trust of at least 
eighty percent (80%) of the Parcels. No such amendment shall be effective 
unless written notice of the amendment is sent to every Owner and mortgagee 
appearing in the records of the Declarant at least thirty (30) days in 
advance of any action taken. No such amendment shall be effective 
unless recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Utah County, 
Utah. 
Section 8.8 Severability. Invalidation of any one of these 
covenants or restrictions by judgment or court order shall in no wise 
affect any other provisions which shall remain in full force and effect. 
Section 8.9 ~Compliance CertificateT~~At~the request of any 
Owner or Builder, the Council will certify to any interested lender 
whether or not any default exists hereunder and the amount of any unpaid 
assessments, which certification shall be binding on said Council. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Flying Diamond Development Corporation has 
caused this instrument to be executed as of the date first above appearing. 
Attest: 
FLYING DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT CORPO 
/ 
\y . 
,7s Assistant Secretary H. K McLish, J/ice/ Prfes'ideTi 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) ss. 
C i t y and County o f Denver) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me t h i s | Q -
day of Q , j ^ £ 1977, by H. P. McLish as Vice President and John F. 
Jennings aFAss is tan t Secretary of F ly ing Diamond Development Corpora t ion , 
a Utah corporat ion. 
^ cx^*^ltT N E S S my hand and off1cial seal-
A^.-'^^^orm.5s.on e x D i r e s • My Commission expires March 5, 1978 
+ • ^ ' B L \ ° A . / Notary Public ^ 
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^EXHIBIT A 
TO DECLARATION OF* PROTECTIVE COVENANTS 
DATED ;ARflIL 19^1377 
Conrnendngl at a poIntoWhilch'Is'lNonth 487^46/ feet.and West 1,210.74 fee t 
from the.Northeast, Corner of Section ,15,r,Township 6.South, tRange 3 East, 
Salt Lake £ase andtMeridian; thenceJ Souths0°40142" West '35.2V feet ; 
thence North .83°23l West 78.67 feet^thence Hoigth 39?05Mtest*21.40 
feet ; thenpe South«18°11''West'115.T4 feet;rttience North<85023445u West 
28.84 feet; thence:South 31024' West 314.70;feet; thence South 63°35' 
West 151.62 feet ; thence South 41°39< West 336.00 feet; thence South 
S&3Q1 West 121.30 fee t ; thence North 66r30'tWest 81.70 feet; thence 
North i r 3 f West 81.6a fee t ; thence Nonth 8°5V West 186.47 feet ; 
thence Souj:h 89°52' West 158.49 feet; thence North 197.35 feet; thence 
South 89022' West 86.88 fee t ; thence North 53°22* East 483.85 feet ; 
thence North 34°00 l16" East 217.91 fee t ; thence North 77°00,19M East 
133.42 feet; thence South 84°05 ,38" East 145.77 feet , thence North 
14°00447H East 144.33 feet; Thence South 55000'29H East 183.16 fee t ; 
thence South 63 00' East 50.00 feet ; thence along the arc of a 656.38 
foot radius curve to the r ight 22.83 f e e t , the chord of which bears 
South 27°59 l48" West 22.83 fee t ; thence South 44°00' East 251.54 feet to 








Addendum B - Picture of Raven 
000043 
Addendum C - December 3, 2002 letter from Landrith to the 
Association 
George (Lanny) Landrith, Jr. 
892 Osmond Lane 




Osmond Lane Homeowners Association Tuesday, December 03, 2002 
Enclosed are two items: 
S> O 
1) First Virginia Bank check 1024, dated December 3,2002, 
2) a copy of the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association invoice # 
.*f!JI3M 
dated / /~3 .y-g)3„ f b r / / , ; / 3 , 
^ 
3^o 
_, which the enclosed check pays for. 
I make this payment despite my belief that I owe none of it. Thus, my payment of this 
invoice is NOT any agreement on my part of the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice. 
Also - except for the yearly dues owed — the enclosed check constitutes full payment of 
any money owed by me to Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association - especially any 
money owed for expenditures to lawyers. Your depositing the enclosed check 
acknowledges the payment as being full payment of any money owed by me to the 
Association except for the yearly dues. 
Received by: 
^y, ^Ll^yf-
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Addendum D - Copy of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, 
technical, or other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (11) 
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (HI) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is 
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community. 
Advisory Committee Note. 
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule 702 as it appeared before it 
was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 
amendment to the Rule added that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended 
rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many respects the developments 
in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and 
federal approaches to expert testimony. 
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be applied to all expert testimony. 
In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like 
its federal counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a '"gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert 
testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational 
skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles or 
methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is 
receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or 
techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields of 
knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all "specialized" 
knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular 
proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on the 
"work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the "work at 
hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration. 
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally accepted principles and 
methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. I t might 
be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply 
these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or 
exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony 
that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion about how they should be 
applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case 
specific opinion testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of 
considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under section (c). 
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs. non-novel dichotomy that has 
served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting 
admission under section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability under 
section (b) must be shown by other means. 
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the federal rule. Unlike the 
federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold" 
showing. That "threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be 
admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's 
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is 
broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise. 
Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose 
between - the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge 
to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for 
the trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may be 
determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26, deposition testimony and memoranda 
of counsel. 
Addendum E - Ruling, entered January 18, 2007 
v># 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 1 




GEORGE C. LANDRITH, JR., 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 060400414 
DATED: JANUARY 18,2007 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant George Landrith Jr.'s ("Landrith") 
motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the file and being fully advised, I deny the 
motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case was brought by the Osmond Land Homeowners Association (the "HOA"), who 
filed a complaint to enforce a lien assessed against real property owned by Landrith and located 
at 892 Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah. In autumn of 2005, the HOA incurred costs in causing 
certain work to be performed on Landrith's property, allegedly to cure safety issues that arose 
due to soil erosion. The HOA assessed those amounts against Landrith's property, and Landrith 




amounts. Landrith moved for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that the HOA lacked the 
authority to assess fees or assert liens under the Declaration of Protective Covenants (the 
"Declaration") to which Landrith's property is subject. 
In making this motion, Landrith concedes that his property is subject to the covenants in 
the Declaration and has not disputed that his property is generally subject to assessments for 
exterior maintenance. Landrith's sole contention is based on the argument that the Declaration 
grants authority to make such assessments not to the HOA, but to the George Osmond Estates 
Council. Citing a separate action between Landrith and the HOA that was decided in favor of 
the HOA in 2002, the HOA first counters that Landrith's argument is barred by the doctrine of 
issue preclusion. The HOA further claims that although it lacks authority to impose assessments 
under the Declaration, its authority has been ratified by the homeowners. Finally, the HOA 
asserts that it also has authority to impose assessments as a collective body of individual 
homeowners. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar Landrith's Challenge to the HOA's Authority. 
I will begin by addressing the HOA's claim that Landrith's argument is barred by issue 
preclusion. In Utah, issue preclusion bars parties from relitigating issues where: 
[1] [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the issue 
in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the 
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 18, f 27, 110 P.3d 678 (quoting 
Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, \ 15, 982 P.2d 65). It is undisputed that the 
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parties are identical and that the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
However, as Landrith correctly points out, the second and third requirements of issue preclusion 
are not met here. 
First, the issue as to whether the HOA can make assessments pursuant to authority the 
Declaration granted to the George Osmond Estates Council is not identical to any issue litigated 
in the prior action. It is undisputed that Landrith's challenge to the HOA's authority in the prior 
action was based on the argument, which appeared on Landrith's Request for Hearing, that "the 
member of the Homeowners Association did not have the Association's authorization to 
Accumulate the Legal Fees." It is also undisputed that Landrith presently challenges the HOA's 
authority to impose assessments and liens because the declaration vests that authority in the 
George Osmond Estates Council. Any loose and distant relationship these issues may have to 
one another is insufficient to create an identity of issues. See Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App 
326, ^[ 10-14, 142 P.3d 594 (holding that a bankruptcy court's determination of an individual's 
ownership interest in a corporation was not identical to the issue of the individual's ownership 
interest for the purposes of determining whether the individual had standing to defend the 
corporation in a separate action). 
Even if the issues were identical, there can be no issue preclusion where there has not 
been "a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue." Id. at \ 15, 142 P.3d 594. Landrith's 
challenge to the HOA member's authority to "accumulate . . . legal fees" was not even briefed in 
the prior action, and it is undisputed that Landrith's opportunity to address the issue in the oral 
hearing was limited. As in Zufelt^ "[t]he issue [in the present case] was not the central issue in 
the [prior] case, and was only superficially addressed." Id. Therefore, the issue preclusion 
3 
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argument fails on two counts and does not bar Landrith's challenge to the HOA's authority. 
B. The HOA Has Authority to Impose Assessments on Landrith's Property. 
Based on the equitable powers of this court, I find unpersuasive Landrith's argument that 
the HOA lacks authority to impose assessments pursuant to the terms of the Declaration. This 
case falls squarely within the doctrine articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Swan Creek 
Village Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122. In Swan Creek, a new 
homeowners association was incorporated after the original association was involuntarily 
dissolved for failing to file its annual report or pay the filing fee. Despite the fact that the new 
association was not authorized by the governing declaration, which recognized only the original 
association, the court held that the new association had the authority to impose assessments on 
lot owners. 
In holding that the homeowners association had authority to levy assessments, the court 
stated unambiguously that "[w]here property owners have treated an association as one with 
authority to govern and impose assessments contemplated under the terms of a duly recorded 
governing declaration, they ratify its authority to act." Id. at ^ f 32. In so holding, the court 
emphasized that the homeowners association had been operating under the terms of the 
declaration for nearly twenty years, that the association's authority had been recognized by the 
lot owners during that time, that the lot owners had been paying dues to the association, that the 
association had undertaken property management duties, that no competing association had 
emerged, that the HOA's articles of incorporation and the Declaration were on file years before 
Warne had purchased the lot, and that a court in a prior action had held that the association had 
the power to collect assessments. 
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disputed that the Osmond Estates owners have treated the HOA as an association "with authority 
to govern and impose assessments contemplated under the terms of [the Declaration]." Id. It is 
also undisputed that the lot owners, including Landrith, have paid dues to the HOA and have 
otherwise recognized the HOA's authority. The HOA submitted affidavit evidence that Landrith 
has repeatedly paid the HOA annual fees, special fees, and assessments for prior repairs and 
maintenance. Landrith has not submitted any evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, it is 
undisputed that the HOA has been operating pursuant to the terms of the Declaration for nearly 
twenty-eight years, that the association has undertaken property management duties, that no 
competing association has emerged, that the Declaration was recorded prior to Landrith's 
acquiring property in George Osmond Estates, and that the HOA's authority to levy assessments 
was upheld in a prior action. 
Landrith attempts to distinguish Swan Creek, but the differences cited are immaterial. 
Landrith essentially focuses on the fact that in Swan Creek, the new homeowners association was 
the same type of entity and bore the same name as the original association that had been 
dissolved. And in the present case, the Declaration grants authority to a corporation operating 
under the name "George Osmond Estates Council," whereas the HOA is an unincorporated 
association d.b.a. Osmond Lane Homeowners Association. The cited difference, however, is 
without consequence. The Swan Creek case was not decided based on the official name of the 
homeowners association or what type of entity it happened to be. The court explicitly articulated 
the important factors in its decision, and the association's name and type of entity were not 
among them. Landrith has failed to cite any meaningful distinction in the present case. 
Therefore, I find Landrith's argument to be unpersuasive and deny his motion. 
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Therefore, I find Landrith's argument to be unpersuasive and deny his motion. 
Because I am denying Landrith's motion based on the law articulated in Swan Creek, it is 
unnecessary to address the HOA's argument that it possesses the authority to levy assessments as 
a collective body of individual lot owners. However, I will briefly address why this argument is 
unlikely to prevail. The only power that the Declaration grants to individual lot owners is "to 
institute proceedings at law or in equity." The authority to levy assessments cannot fit within 
any reasonable interpretation of this provision. The individual lot owners therefore had no such 
authority to collectively exercise through the HOA. As stated by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado, "an agent can have no greater power than its principal." Romer v. B d. of County 
Com'rs, 956 P.2d 566, 581 (Colo. 1998). 
III. CONCLUSION 
I deny Defendant Landrith's motion for judgment as a matter of law. I find that 
Landrith's argument is not barred by issue preclusion, but is nevertheless unpersuasive. 
Additionally, there is no cross motion for summary judgment from the HOA properly before this 
court and, as such, I am addressing Landrith's motion for summary judgment only. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the HOA's counsel is directed to 
prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this \^_ day of January, 2007. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a4rue and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this \0 day of January, 2007: 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Lori D. Huntington 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
LORI WOFFINDEN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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Addendum F - Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, entered May 31, 2007 
FILED 
Thomas W. Seiler #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
2500 North University Ave. 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 




GEORGE C. LANDRITH JR. 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 060400414 
Division: 8; Judge: Schofield 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, 
the Honorable Anthony WriSchofietd7©istricl Court Judge, presiding, on April 26, 2007. 
Thomas W. Seiler and Lori D. Huntington of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, were present for 
the Plaintiff. Russell A. Cline of Crippen & Cline, LC, was present for the Defendant. The 
Court having fully reviewed the pleadings submitted by the parties relative to the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, including the pleadings submitted to the Court by the Defendant, 
MAY 3 1 2001 
4*mojsracT 
STATE OF UTAH 
\xm\ COUNTY r 
and having heard counsel's oral arguments, and good cause appearing therefore, does, hereby, 
Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. 
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has authority to act, in all ways, as the George 
Osmond Estate's council, and can act pursuant to that certain Declaration of Protective 
Covenants recorded with the Office of the Utah County Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, as 
Entry No. 12087 in Book 1546 commencing at page 760 including the amendments thereto. 
3. The Court reserves for further determination any amounts which may be owed by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
DATED this day of _ frW , 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE ANf HO; 
Fourth District C 
^i££k^ 
Approved as to Form: 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC 
k'KST 0*r-^ 
JSSELL A. CLINE 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \^Vh day of fTVfluu 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
was served by mailing via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
N \Huntington\Osmond LaneAOrder Granting Plaintiffs MSj wpd 
^mi^Lphc 
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Addendum G - Special Verdict, dated December 5,2008 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 




GEORGE C. LANDRITH JR. 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case No.: 060400414 
Judge Lynn Davis 
1. Do you find that every lot in the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association was 
jequired to be kept and maintained by the owner thereof in a clean, safe, attractive and sightly 
condition, and in good repair? 
Yes. A No Q 
2. Do you find that George Landrith, Jr. breached the Declaration of Protective 
Covenants? 
Yes f) No 0 
If your answer to question 1 or 2 above is yes, then please answer the next question. 
If your answer is no, you may return this Special Verdict form to the bailiff. 
3. Do you find that the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association was entitled to 
provide exterior maintenance upon the George Landrith, Jr. lot as follows: paint, repair, replace 
and care for roofs, gutters, down spouts, exterior building surfaces, trees, shrubs, grass walks, 
and other exterior improvements. 
Yes__£ No Q 
4. Do you find that the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association repaired the 
damage caused by erosion (referred to throughout the trial as the hole) by contracting with 
various entities to replace the railroad tie retaining wall with new retaining walls? 
Yes jjj No O 
5. What amount do you award the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association 
(the Plaintiff)? 
$ .V>.l43.fr2 
Please sign below and return this Special Verdict to the bailiff. 




Addendum H - Judgment (with Revised Calculation of 
Interest), entered January 13,2009 
Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
Aaron D. Lancaster, #11406 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2500 N. University Ave. 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNER'S 




GEORGE LANDRITH, JR., 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT (WITH REVISED 
CALCULATION OF INTEREST) 
Civil No. 060400414 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 4, and 5,2008 before the 
above-entitled Court and a jury impaneled for the purpose of this trial. 
Judgment shall enter in this matter in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant as 
follows: 
a. Damages as awarded in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant by the 
jury in the amount of $33,143.62. 
1 
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b. Interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on the amounts found to be 
owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff from the date the debt was incurred in the 
amount of ten percent (10%) per annum pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 15 -1 -1 (2) 
in the amount of $10,627.75. 
c. Attorneys' fees reasonable incurred in this matter in the amountof $59,831.90. 
d. Costs in the amount of $1,815.02 
For a judgment in total in the amount $105,418.29. 
This Judgment shall be augmented by interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum until 
paid in full. It shall further be augmented by reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
collecting the same by execution or otherwise as may be established by affidavit. 
In the absence of payment in full the Plaintiff is entitled to execute upon the real property 
which is the subject matter of this dispute, Lot 144, Plat "B", George Osmond Estates Subdivision. 
The lien in this matter may be ordered foreclosed by a Sheriffs Sale of that property at the earliest 
possible date. 
DATED this jj>_ day o i j f e ^ , 200£_. 
B Y T H E C 0 U ! f e ' * 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Irf day of December, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT (WITH REVISED CALCULATION OF INTEREST) 
to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C/c<juJU?)fl.'3€teus--
3 
Addendum I - Photocopy of May 15, 2004 Journal Entry by 
Nevan Anderson evidencing agreement between Anderson 
and Landrith 
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